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

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Jeremy Stone

AFTER VIETNAM, WHAT?



Stanley Hoffmann
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MEANING OF BELIEF

Leslie Dewart

ISSUES FOR THE '70s

Harvey Cox

PHILIP ROTH'S DIRTY BOOK

Carl Maloff

AFL-CIO + CIA − ICFTU = 0

Joseph Hill

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NEWS AND VIEWS

The *Washington Post* confirms what hippies and hallucinogenists have been proclaiming for years, and not always ironically: the government has a secret capacity to "turn the world on."

The news spilled at a national drug symposium in Buffalo. The government is stock-piling a form of synthetic marijuana—but for purposes of turning the world off, not on. The planned usage is for chemical warfare.

The *Post*'s Phillip D. Carter got on to Henry G. Pars of Arthur D. Little, Inc., Cambridge, Mass., reputed developer of the happy hallucinogen in collaboration with the Department of Defense.

Pars, of course, knew nothing. Asked if there could be any military application of research into marijuana-type drugs, Pars said, "No, I can't conceive of any, no."

Carter then confronted Pars with a 1966 article in the *Journal of the American Chemical Society*, which described how Pars and a team of scientists had manufactured variants of synthetic marijuana for the Army. Pars backed away from his denial—grudgingly. "It is not my business to be telling you what the Department of Defense is or is not doing," Pars snapped. "I'm certainly not going to go out of my way to disclose things about Department of Defense work."

He doesn't have to; the 1966 article tells all: Pars' genius was to isolate tetrahycrocannabinois (THC), the single most active mind-altering agent in natural marijuana. THC is now being developed as a non-lethal, incapacitating agent. Or, as the Pentagon would bleach it, as "a humane weapon for limiting the cohesiveness of an enemy force while not destroying life."

But a spokesman for the National Institute of Mental Health is skeptical about the claims for TCH. TCH, he commented, deteriorates rapidly and is too bulky and expensive for use in chemical warfare. Better, by far, LSD.; it is "cheaper, more stable and packs a bigger punch in a smaller dose."

According to the NIMH official, an easily portable quantity of LSD introduced into the food or water supply of a major city would be enough to alter radically the sense perceptions of its population for 12 to 14 hours.

•

What "takes issue with Whitehead's treatment of God . . . talks with everybody . . . writes poetry, takes lessons in dancing, music and cooking" . . . is "short, bald and craggy . . . a crackerjack typist . . . tackles questions about God, mind, life, space, time, art, politics" . . . and thinks there's an "historic change at the Catholic University of America"?

Henry Miller? Andrew Greeley? Cardinal O'Boyle? Dan Herr? Vilgot Sjöman?

Nope. Paul Weiss. (Quotations from a C.U. press release announcing Weiss' appointment to the Heffer Chair of Philosophy.)

•

Rating the population problem greater than that of the nuclear bomb or any other international issue, Maryland's Senator Tydings has announced that over several weeks he will be introducing a series of bills designed to reorganize and expand U.S. population and family programs, domestic and foreign.

The first bill is already in: S.J.Res.62 asking creation of a Joint Select Committee on Population and Family Planning to review and oversee programs, implement studies, and, in brief, provide leadership which no Administration has thus far been willing to extend the population question.

"This is clearly an issue which cannot be abandoned to endless deliberation and debate," Tydings said on the Senate floor. "We must act now before history moves the means of solution beyond our reach."

Tydings would begin by broadening and sophisticating birth control programs in the U.S. "We are not going to be able to provide leadership, either in Latin America or in Asia, unless we put our own house in order, unless we have a responsible population program at home, and unless we can provide opportunity for responsible family planning for all the citizens of this country without regard to their degree of affluence."

Tydings estimates that there are 5 million women in the U.S. who would like to be able to plan their families, but who are shut off by ignorance and poverty.

S.J.Res.62 has been referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

•

There have long been rumors how lucrative the Department of Agriculture's stabilization and conservation program has been to Mississippi's Senator Eastland and Eastland Plantations, Inc.

Edward R. Slemmer of Allentown, Pa., itemized precisely how lucrative in a letter to the March 2 *Times*. Going back to 1964, Slemmer found Eastland benefitting to a total of $293,271.72.

Most was received in 1966 and 1967, principally for cotton price support and diversion feed grain price support. The 1967 amount reached a handsome $159,677.77.

The 1968 figures are not available as yet, but you can bet they'll be fat.

Slemmer suggests that Congress meditate on those figures before it congratulates itself on any victories in the war on poverty.

•

Pittsburgh woman newscaster Pat Kiely reported recently on Venice's efforts to control the city's pigeon population, whose droppings are ruining marble and bronze monuments. "To cut down on the pigeon population, Venetian officials plan to mix birth control pills in with the grain feed to the birds," she declared, adding the aside: "On wonders . . . Will the Vatican issue a encyclical banning *that*?" The static (WIIC) was deluged with protests—from men.

JOHN DEEDY

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CORRESPONDENCE

Black Anti-Semitism

South Orange, N. J.

To the Editors: Black anti-Semitism is a difficult subject and no one's treatment of it will please all Jews, blacks, and white Gentiles. The least one can ask is that the discussion be kept within the confines of honesty and fairness. Regrettably, John Leo's article, "Black Anti-Semitism" [Feb. 14], remained outside this minimum requirement. His article was not conceived, obviously, as pleasing to Jews; so be it. One can respect his intent to add a corrective, a demurrer, even a scolding to one side of the discussion (the Jewish) and call for a cooling-off. But I am afraid he went far beyond that. If Jews consider his remarks unfair, even insulting, it will not be mere defensiveness or hysteria. Mr. Leo himself has given Jews a lesson in the overkill.

The case he makes in his article rests on the existence of a state of "frenzy" among Jews with respect to black anti-Semitism. To prove it he exhibits five crude examples of anonymous Jews voicing 1) a fear that an atmosphere exists here comparable to that preceding Hitler in Germany, 2) the belief "echoing a widespread fear" that blacks and whites are joining hands to turn against the Jews; 3) the fear of an imminent pogrom in New York. Examples 4 and 5 are unnamed Jews who, respectively, call certain persons supposedly unsympathetic to Jewish interests a "son of a bitch" and a "racist bastard." To bolster this flimsy foundation he throws in what he considers Mr. Paul O'Dwyer's contribution to the overkill and to which —with an eye to his employer?—he renders the ultimate *coup de grace*: 'The *Times* found it too irrelevant to publish."

The experience of the present writer, which includes discussions with numerous Jewish leaders and dozens of Jewish congregational groups concerning black anti-Semitism, contradicts Mr. Leo's sampling. Expectedly, there are

(Continued on page 30)

NEWS & VIEWS: 2 **CORRESPONDENCE: 3**
EDITORIALS: 3
STOP THE WORLD: *Joseph Hill* **5**
AFTER VIETNAM, WHAT?
William Pfaff, William V. Shannon, Jeremy J. Stone, Carl Oglesby, Wilson Carey McWilliams, Stanley Hoffmann **7**
THE MEANING OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF: *Leslie Dewart* **15**
ISSUES FOR THE '70s: *Harvey Cox* **18**
VERSE: *Carol Johnson* **17** *Josephine Jacobsen* **22**
THE SCREEN: *Philip T. Hartung* **21**
RECORDS: *B. H. Haggin* **20**
BOOKS: **23**
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VIETNAM: GORDIAN KNOT

"The time has passed in which great nations can dictate to small nations their future."—President Nixon, on the Middle East crisis.

The Tet offensive continues as *Commonweal* goes to press with an issue discussing "after Vietnam." The war, in fact, is still terribly present. Since the new administration took office, the casualties, Vietnamese and American, military and civilian, have stretched into the tens of thousands. Nixon the candidate had a plan—*in petto*—to settle the war. He would not reveal it—to keep the war out of campaign politics, he explained—and he has not revealed it yet. Instead, a complete review of the situation is underway. Government, Saigon style, continues. There are 45,000 political prisoners being held without trial—not counting Vietcong POWs. Michael D. Roberts of the *Cleveland Plain Dealer* adds the latest in the string of bitter summations by returning U.S. correspondents: "The GVN is a thinly disguised tyranny that closes newspapers with flimsy explanations, harasses those who would dare to speak out in public, and takes from the people in the form of corruption. . . . its officials continue to grow wealthy from the ways of war, corruption and the American dollar. Given peace tomorrow, the GVN would only have to face another armed group preparing to rid the land of oppression."

After the November bombing halt, Hanoi pulled 22 out of 25 regiments in northern South Vietnam back across the border, freeing American troops to engage in battalion-sized operations further south. The Vietcong, according to a *Newsweek* report, gave way with a "curious lack of resistance"; and Washington and Saigon began once more to grind out statistics demonstrating the succcess of "Accelerated Pacification." The statistics may be "garbage" (as suggested by Congressman John V. Tunney who recently reported

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on the matter for the House Foreign Affairs Committee), or they may be "just a numbers game we're playing for Paris" (U.S. military man's opinion, cited by David Hoffman in the *Washington Post*); but the new determination in South Vietnam to go for a "victory" was real.

The Tet offensive should have changed some minds: the Vietcong showed that their military capacities were as effective as ever. The hawks, however, were alrady on the wing. Washington cried escalation and pointed to its invisible "understanding" with Hanoi. Vice President Ky urged bombing of the North; and, in a memo to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Abrams did the same. All ignored the truth of the situation. Allied operations had recently increased by 25 percent and pushed into area long held by the Vietcong. "We escalated," says Averell Harriman; the Vietcong offensive is "essentially a response to our actions." When the U.S. steps up its military drive this only reflects good military sense. When the enemy strikes back, it evidently demonstrates the Communists' well-known contempt for international agreements.

The official U.S. reaction to Tet repeats the American pattern of thought throughout the war: we establish a set of standards that implicitly assumes America's right to determine South Vietnam's destiny. When the other side, unwilling to accept the postulate of U.S. omnicompetence, refuses to abide by our standards, we cry "foul," "aggression," or "escalation." Based on the flimsiest patchwork of agreements and on realpolitik considerations now undermined by changes in the Communist world, our interference in South Vietnam is, of course, justified. Hanoi's interest, based on the Geneva agreements of 1954 on on very concrete, local power clashes, is naturally unthinkable. Our reactionary dictatorship is the "best under the circumstances." Hanoi's popularly-based dictatorship is an offense against human dignity. Our massive and arbitrary killing is a necessary evil. The NLF's assassinations were criminal terrorism. Our half-million troops from across the ocean are allies. Hanoi's far fewer troops are outside aggressors.

The corruption of the Saigon government is unfortunate, but progress is always being made. The "attacks on government corruption and . . . exemplary Communist behavior of the Vietcong" demonstrates (according to an AID official's report on pacification) that "the insurgents have exploited the Confucian tenets of ethical rule." When the enemy's basis for negotiation included the point that South Vietnam's future must be determined in accordance with the program of the NLF, that was a demand for unconditional surrender. When Ambassador Goldberg and other dignitaries proposed that the Vietcong simply lay down their arms and participate in normal political life (with a Saigon government that presumably had not laid down *its* arms), that was only an honorable offer. And when Vietnamese peasants were to be herded into strategic hamlets and all Vietcong elements rooted out, that was—according to Roger Hilsman—to allow them a "free choice."

Liberals have deluded themselves into thinking that all we wanted in Vietnam was for the other side to respect "the rules of the game"—*our* rules, of course, constructed so as to serve *our* purposes. Those rules were to strengthen world stability: they have weakened it. Those rules were to assure the well-being of the Vietnamese: grim fantasy, that! All that remains to legitimize our rules is the blind conviction that History has ordained America with a world mission, to control the pace and means of other nations' development, to "build nations," to chastise "romantic revolutionaries." Our inability to accomplish these tasks, like that of the colonizing powers before us, is irrelevant. A world mission is a world mission.

Our Vietnam intervention is a Gordian knot of lies, deceptions and delusions which we can disentangle only with a clean sweep of the truth. The truth is that the people of South Vietnam are divided by a struggle to determine who shall rule their land and in what direction, a struggle prolonged and envenomed by American intervention; and that the United States has no right to arbitrate, by means of a vast war, the outcome of that struggle. The truth admitted, the diplomatic formulas for de-escalation, for coalition governments, for elections, for safeguards against post-war purges could all be swiftly devised. Would such a reversal of American aims be a surrender? Yes, in exactly the same way as a Soviet withdrawal from Czechoslovakia would be a surrender. A surrender to wisdom and morality.

"Mr. President, you have a clear mandate to bring a speedy and peaceful end to the Vietnam conflict. Your election is the result of events which reflect overwhelming disillusionment with America's course in that tortured land. We believe that any effort to maintain that course is an act of disdain for the political process that brought this administration to office and risks the further rending of American society.

"The Saigon regime is the chief obstacle in the way of peace. As an agent of war, the regime has been incompetent; as an agent of peace it is impossible. Reliable reports indicate that the NLF and Hanoi are ready to accept a broadly based government in Saigon. This readiness cannot be tested as long as the ruling clique in Saigon has American support in repressing, by torture and imprisonment, all political alternatives to itself.

"There is no question of the United States 'imposing' a coalition government upon Saigon. The United States is now imposing the Thieu-Ky regime upon the people of South Vietnam. The United States must now step back from imposing its will and permit a new leadership to emerge that will be able to achieve peace in Vietnam."

—*Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam*

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LABOR'S ESTABLISHMENT

STOP THE WORLD . . .

When the aging president-emeritus of the Garment Workers, David Dubinsky, voted "present" on the question before the Executive Council of the AFL-CIO at one of its concluding morning sessions at Bal Harbour, Florida, last month, he might well have experienced one of those flashbacks into his career—one which contains myriad interlocking roles in the history of American labor, social democracy and left-wing political fratricide.

The question involved concurrence with the recommendations of the AFL-CIO's Department of International Relations, headed by Jay Lovestone, which called for total and unconditional withdrawal by the American labor body from the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Accompanying the call for concurrence without dissent was a vituperative attack by George Meany on the world labor organization, which claims 64 million affiliate members in 94 non-Communist countries.

Only goateed Jack Potofsky of the Clothing Workers abstained. As always, George Meany got what he wanted without a dissenting vote, and by virtual fiat the spokesmen for the mainstream of American labor announced that they had decided to stop the world so they could get off. Almost incredibly, at a time when even the administration of Richard Nixon had declared that it was ready to end the era of confrontation to begin the era of negotiations, an important sector of the liberal democratic community in the United States declared itself for an unreconstructed and strident anti-Communism.

Dubinsky, knowing all this, must have reflected upon the ironic twists of history, for in many ways it was he, Meany and Lovestone who created the ICFTU 20 years previous as a vehicle of fighting Communism in the trade unions at home and abroad—as well as being a valuable instrument of Marshall Plan foreign policy. More ironic, perhaps, was the other undisputed footnote in labor history—that the Garment Workers' chief more than any other person was responsible for the success and present influence of both Meany and Lovestone.

Few would have thought that when Dubinsky brought them together in 1941 two men with such outwardly clashing backgrounds would within three decades come to hold virtual veto power over important aspects of American domestic and foreign policy. Meany epitomized the "responsible" trade union leader: a strong advocate of the virtues of free enterprise, pragmatic, honest, staunch and an uncompromising anti-Communist, cigar-chewing and a man to put at ease any meeting of employers with his famous declaration that he had never personally been in a strike or walked a picket line (a boast he could still make 28 years later). He was recognized as a real comer among union executives.

Lovestone, on the other hand, had only recently emerged from the subterranean labyrinth of American Communism and radicalism between the two World Wars. There was a time, just prior to the 1929 crash, when he had actually been the head of the C.P. in the United States. He participated in the intrigue and character assassinations that were common to the Trotsky-Stalin warfare within international Communism, and in a harrowing experience which might have been written by Ian Fleming, Lovestone was forcibly held in Moscow while Comintern agents proceeded to destroy his following of American C.P. cadres, and he was accordingly excommunicated from both leadership and membership. Undaunted, he formed his own Communist party in opposition and with other familiar names who were to make careers of their ex-Communism, such as Benjamin Gitlow, Bertram Mandel and Bertram Wolfe, continued to hold meetings and issue manifestos in the telephone booths of New York, Chicago and Detroit for the next decade.

When Dubinsky discovered Lovestone, there was a market for informed veterans of the left who knew the tactics and ideology of fighting the left, both Communist and non-Communist. The unlikely joining of the careers of Meany and Lovestone, who by then had become head of the Garment Workers' international affairs department, was consummated. From that time, the doctrine of anti-Communism and the foreign posture of the American Federation of Labor became one and the same. With little difficulty it became also the policy of the merged AFL-CIO after 1955. Jay Lovestone, who all through these years remained as the single most important consular to Meany, retained the enigmatic role he had played both within and without mainline American Communism, participating in top-level decisions, always present yet rarely seen or photographed. Interestingly enough, there is no record of his public repudiation of Communism or his embracing Meany's thing—partnership capitalism between government, business and labor.

In 1949 the Soviet presence in Europe was a real threat to not only the post-war governments of the West, but the non-Communist trade unions of France and Italy. General strikes and the prospect of a revival of the Popular Front in France alarmed the U.S. It was a time for cold warfare and matching the Communists at their own game, and so enters—Jay Lovestone, of course.

Thomas W. Braden, then Allen Dulles' deputy director in the Central Intelligence Agency, would later write that Lovestone had "an enormous grasp of foreign intel-

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ligence operations." His account of the French counter-stroke using American labor would set the pace for a decade and a half of later involvement abroad by the AFL-CIO: ". . . into the crisis stepped Lovestone and his assistant Irving Brown. With funds from Dubinsky's union, they organized the *Force Ouvrier*, a non-Communist union. When they ran out of money, they appealed to the CIA. Thus began the secret subsidy of free trade unions which soon spread to Italy."

Braden, who "told all" in the wake of the 1967 disclosures of CIA involvement in funding American student, labor and cultural fronts abroad, recalled candidly that Brown passed CIA money "to pay off the strong-arm squads in Mediterranean ports" breaking Communist-led strikes. The formation of the ICTFU in November, 1949, in London was the result of several years of involvement by Lovestone and Brown in Europe, directed by Meany and largely funded by Dubinsky. It was the "free world" answer to the Soviet-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions, which the CIO had left the year before.

In building a strong, non-Communist free trade union movement, however, it was inevitable that dependence upon American leadership and American money would diminish; the emergency assistance to unions in the Marshall Plan era was acceptable to European labor leaders, but the continued presence of people like Brown, whose CIA associations were acknowledged, became a sensitive issue, and one of political liability to those unions who did not speak out against clandestine operations. This, coupled with the Meany support of America's military adventure in Asia, further alienated the ICFTU member nations in Europe from the AFL-CIO. In 1965 Meany openly expressed his displeasure over the Confederation's lack of enthusiasm for the cold war, urging it to return to the old "major task (of) fighting Communism." Later, when the ICFTU declined to support the American involvement in Vietnam, the AFL-CIO chief responded by declaring that its Brussels Secretariat was infiltrated "by a bunch of homosexuals."

Walter Reuther and the UAW became a convenient strawman for breaking the Confederation knot. Meany alleged that the ICFTU had been guilty of "shabby treatment," but actually the international organization had turned back the UAW bid for affiliation in an effort toward reconciliation. The withdrawal was inevitable, in keeping with the 1966 boycott of the International Labor Organization because a Polish representative had been elected chairman, and the McCarthyite denunciation of the small anti-war faction within the AFL-CIO (Meany charged a meeting of labor doves had been "planned in Hanoi," despite the fact that most of its organization and support had been by Potofsky's Clothing Workers).

The extent of alienation between the AFL-CIO and the "free world" labor camp was reflected in an exchange among the German Metalworkers federation leadership and Meyer Bernstein, the Steelworkers' International Affairs head, who urged their support for the war in Vietnam and in the process observed that his members were participating in a program which "sends thousands of dollars of chocolate milk to South Vietnamese children." The Germans responded, negatively, pointing out that "chocolate milk and napalm do not mix."

In pragmatic terms of its own goals and objectives, the AFL-CIO no longer needs the ICFTU. It has a far-flung network of labor fronts which it directly controls and which are also funded by the government and in some instances by industry. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee disclosed last year that the American Institute for Free Labor Development—run out of a highly-guarded Fort Royal, Virginia complex—obtained over $20-million from the U.S. Agency for International Development since 1962. AIFLD has boasted of its involvement in the military coup in Brazil in 1964, and its role in Guiana politics. AIFLD supports American presence in the Dominican Republic and can always be counted upon to support the rivals of non-Communist but anti-American trade unions. The African-American Labor Center, which received $2.5-million in AID funds during 1967 and 1968 alone, is headed by Irving Brown, which should speak enough of its involvement in the shadow-land surrounding the rise and fall of governments in post-colonial Africa. Finally, the brand-new Asian-American Free Labor Institute has set up shop in Saigon, concerned with the free trade union movement in those free-world Asian outposts of South Vietnam, South Korea, Formosa and Thailand.

Forty years ago Jay Lovestone, locked behind the Kremlin walls, was a short-lived pawn of the Comintern strategy in dominating foreign Communist parties. Today he resides in the power center of American labor, directing policies throughout the world and effecting decisions which have led not only to the almost total isolation of labor in the United States but in all probability the return of most of the non-Communist labor movement abroad into the Soviet influence orbit. As with the late John Foster Dulles—with enemies like these, why should the Russians need friends? JOSEPH HILL

(Joseph Hill is a pseudonym for a journalist specializing in labor affairs.)

Coming

Murray Polner on the cases of William Harvey and George Daniels, USMC-ex:

"To find two young Negro marines guilty for saying in private conversations no more than what was on the lips of tens of millions of civilian Americans condemns the Marine Corps for its parochial and authoritarian manners."

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AFTER VIETNAM, WHAT?

William Pfaff

'Like imperial Germany, we are tone-deaf in diplomacy'

Where do we go from here? Assuming, that is, that we are really in the final stages of the Vietnam war. What we *should* do now is a factor in what we *will* do, and let me talk about that.

If Richard Nixon ends this war—on virtually any terms—then I think that this country will collapse into calm, and gratefully reelect the man in 1972. Not, of course, total calm: the domestic troubles of the United States remain very great, but it has been the war that has infused political controversy in America with its present edge and cruelty. One consequence of Vietnam is that for many Americans, many of them on the left, political argument hardly remains possible—only accusation, verbal assault, condemnation, taunt.

We will experience a reasonable calm if there are no more Vietnams. I do not think that it will take an American "Algeria" to discredit interventionism, but I may be wrong. There are many in and out of government who insist that a "bad" settlement (and they would consider bad almost any settlement remotely possible) will have calamitous results. Since these are mostly the same people who, as Hawks, have steadily worked to create a situation in which

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anything less than victory is calamity —and to convince the world of this —they may be right.

There certainly will be domestic bitterness. The American public has never really experienced failure. My suspicion is that we have more than adequate defense mechanisms—that America's introversion and national optimism will muffle reality. We will barely acknowledge what has happened, repressing the truth, grateful that the war is over. But if that should not happen, and the terms of the settlement (or its outcome) come as a shock, we could turn bitterly isolationist—and resume tearing ourselves apart in controversy. That seems more likely than renewed interventions. Most likely of all is a fairly slow and baffled inward-turning. One can hardly imagine a right-wing, stab-in-the-back movement of any consequence against the Nixon administration: thus cause for gratitude that this administration is Republican and conservative.

What will happen in American foreign policy itself will be less a matter of intellectual choice and resolute revisions than a slow and disorderly retreat. The battle among the theorists has been going on for years without decisive effect. Policy follows theory—if at all—by erratic leaps, when a bright formulation of ideas coincides with an appropriate crisis. (The ideas may be good or bad, "containment," "collective security," "stages of growth." Eventually each is irrelevantly inflated by the policy process into a general principle of action, a universal problem solvent. Containment, a specific policy addressed to the specific problems presented by Stalin's Russia in Central and Southern Europe in 1947-48, is still—in the teeth of George Kennan's protests —being applied in Southeast Asia today.) Or policy shifts crab-wise under the buffeting of events. We have become a neo-isolationist nation in mood without knowing what neo-isolationism might mean, or caring very much.

But let me attempt to name the themes in the debate. There is *conservative interventionism:* arguing that ours is the decade of penultimate battle with Communism. The struggle is ideological; the very divisions within Communism make it the more dangerous, multiplying its appeals. There is *liberal interventionism:* the penultimate battle really is with world poverty and disorder. We and the Communists provide warring "models," to one or the other of which the rest of the world must conform, eventually providing either liberalism or Communism the palm of historical victory. There is *liberal legalism*: avoid unilateral interventions; build cooperation with Russia; build up collective security alliances and regional organizations; build up the UN; extend arms control. The UN will police the world. Or regional organizations will do it. Or we and Russia will do it together (several versions of this theory exist). There is *neo-isolationism*: what happens in much of the world, and certainly on the Asian mainland and in Africa, is of little direct relevance to American national interests and (or) beyond our power to do much about. There is the "*realist*" position: foreign policy is the art of staying afloat; history is bloody-minded; the Third World's troubles have very little essentially to do with the ideologies of Russia or America. The United States chiefly has reason to worry about Russia, a great power and a hostile one, and about Europe and Japan—the societies which can make a difference in the world. Keep relations stable among these and we —and the Third World—may all manage to stay afloat. There is the (American) *radical left* position: the West and Russia alike are in the last stages of bureaucratic industrial despotism; revolution is required here and in the Third World. What revolution means for the Third World can be described. What it means for us we don't know, nor much care since it inevitably will be an improvement (history is benign; man progresses).



The Nixon administration, like its Democratic predecessor, is made up of men from all but the last of these groups. The influence of the interventionists obviously is down, that of the neo-isolationists and realists up, that of the legalists probably fairly steady. (That legalist sub-group which finds a solution in implicit Soviet-American condominium, shaken by Czechoslovakia, probably has lost ground, although it still is influential, especially among officials from scientific and technocratic backgrounds.) But these shifts of influence are practical and political; the outcome of events, not argument.

More important to the long-run policy of this country are certain enduring factors in the American worldview. I have written before about them in this magazine—moral isolation, a certain messianism, an apolitical ambition to find "final" solutions (legal, organizational, or military). This country does change its foreign policy, and periodically it has been forced back onto limited, "realistic," programs. But we always drift back again towards the tantalizing absolutes—towards total withdrawal from the world, or totally making the world over. (In this respect, the New Left's apocalyptic goals are, like bombing, as American as cherry pie.)

We have, I think, no great talent for foreign politics. Like imperial Germany, we are tone-deaf in diplomacy, and not really very interested in the rest of the world. We are uneasy about the opinions of others, yet defiantly righteous—are we not God's New Israel? We are chastened now, and turning inward. We could reverse, if Paris goes badly, and that would be very bad for us, and assuredly for Vietnam. If things go well, ours will not really have been an intellectual conversion, but only that we—whose national virtue, after all, is pragmatism—have tried the other way and it didn't work.

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William V. Shannon

The U.S. cannot abandon all forms of intermediate force

It may well be that there are no lessons to be learned from Vietnam. The cry is heard, "No more Vietnams!" In the heat of controversy, all of us, myself included, are prone to the large generalization and the angry imperative but my reading of history suggests to me that each major foreign policy decision is made on its own merits with no controlling deference to past mistakes or triumphs.

There will be no more Vietnams but only because no other country is exactly like Vietnam. It could be argued, for example, that one lesson drawn from the Vietnamese experience is that the United States ought not to send armies to fight on the mainland of Asia. This seems sensible enough. Yet if the Communists reopen the war in Korea, the United States more likely than not would again use force to prevent South Korea from being overrun.

It is not at all certain that the United States is even going to withdraw all its troops from South Vietnam after a peace is achieved there. Following World War II and the Korean war, this country stationed troops in Germany and Korea to stabilize the balance of power in those divided countries. An American military presence may also persist in Vietnam for a long time after a settlement is reached there. I am not predicting such a development, but neither do I think we should be surprised if it happens.

If the focus of fighting in Southeast Asia shifts to Thailand, it is improbable that the U.S. would intervene actively to save that country's present government. Having seen what happened to the Truman and Johnson administrations for fighting small wars in Asia, the Nixon administration cannot have much eagerness to get itself involved in a third such conflict. But on the other hand, if Thailand were subverted by a successful "war of liberation," that would not only undermine the fragile settlements in Laos and (presumably) in Vietnam but would also endanger all of Southeast Asia running down to Malaysia and Singapore. That brings us back to the domino theory.

To critics of the war, the domino theory like the Munich analogy is hopelessly discredited and ridiculous. But it still remains the fundamental rationale for American intervention in Southeast Asia. In the past, President Nixon has espoused it firmly. He may have jettisoned it along with other intellectual and political baggage he has no use for in the White House. But then again he may not. He chose career diplomat U. Alexis Johnson, an unrepentant hawk, as Undersecretary of State. Senator Fulbright significantly voted against confirming Johnson.

Then there is the Middle East. More than ten years afterward, it is difficult to understand exactly what President Eisenhower had in mind when he sent the Marines to Lebanon. In any case, he was able quickly to withdraw them. Americans have no taste for intervening now in the Middle East to protect Israel. Yet in the unlikely event that the Arabs were about to defeat Israel militarily, the U.S. would be hard put to stand by during a second act of genocide against Jews. The Israelis are so determined and militarily so effective that the question of American intervention on their behalf is not likely to arise. But any active policy in the Middle East entails military risks which should be recognized.

Africa has never been a candidate for American military intervention. The Central Intelligence Agency did assist the central government of the

An Influential Opinion

"For the two decades after 1945, our international activities were based on the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in 'emerging countries.' This direct 'operational' concept of international order has proved too simple. . . .

"It is in the new countries that questions of the purpose of political life and the meaning of political legitimacy . . . pose themselves in their most acute form. . . .

"The American role in the new nations' efforts to build legitimate authority is in need of serious reexamination. The dominant American view about political structure has been that it will follow more or less automatically upon economic progress and that it will take the form of constitutional democracy. Both assumptions are subject to serious questions. . . .

"We cannot pretend that what happens to over two-thirds of humanity is of no concern or interest to the United States. This does not mean that our goal should be to transfer American institutions . . . even less that we should impose them. Nor should we define the problem as how to prevent the spread of communism. Our goal should be to build a moral consensus which can make a pluralistic world creative rather than destructive.

"Irrelevance to one of the great revolutions of our time will mean that we will ultimately be engulfed by it—if not physically, then psychologically. Already some of the protest movements have made heroes of . . . . protagonists of the totalitarian state—such as Guevara or Ho or Mao. . . .

HENRY A. KISSINGER
(In *Agenda for the Nation*, Brookings Institution, 1969)

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Congo in 1961 but that was under the cover of wide United Nations and black African support for the Congolese Government against Moise Tshombe's rebellious regime in Katanga. When a much more modest unilateral effort to assist the Congolese government was attempted last year, Senate pressure forced the Johnson administration to desist. In the Nigeria vs. Biafra civil war, the Johnson administration followed a scrupulously "correct" policy of neutrality. But many in and out of Congress who are doves on Vietnam want the United States to intervene politically and diplomatically, though not militarily, on behalf of Biafra. This is an inconsistency which those who believe that the United States can follow a uniform no-intervention policy have to take into account.

As for Latin America, the survival of Castro has made it less likely that the U.S. will intervene in the future in that region. If we can accommodate ourselves to an actively hostile regime in Cuba, there is no reason to suppose that we would be upset by the coming to power of a Communist government in Bolivia or Colombia.

This "tour of the horizon" suggests that only Thailand and Korea are strong possibilities for future American involvement in small Vietnam-type wars. The balance of power is unstable in Asia, and American policymakers in the future will have to make some hard choices there as to where this nation's interests lie and whether they are worth fighting for. As I indicated at the outset, it is impossible to say to what extent the backwash of the Vietnam experience will influence those future decisions. I can only remind the readers of this journal that they should remember that most generals, diplomats, and members of the intelligence community do not share the adverse view of Vietnam which prevails among liberals and on college campuses. Much will depend upon the judgment of the President who has to make those decisions.

There is a large generalization



which may have emerged from the Vietnam experience but it is too early to discern its final shape. In the 1950's, John Foster Dulles attempted to cope with local aggressions by the threat of "instant massive nuclear retaliation." That attempt collapsed of its own weight because no one could really believe we would risk a nuclear war to decide the fate of Seoul or Saigon. In 1961, President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense McNamara brought forward the concept of "graduated deterrence," specifically in Europe but with implications for the entire world. It meant using conventional armed forces first rather than responding to an attack with nuclear weapons. That has now collapsed because the NATO countries in Europe refuse to maintain the armies necessary to make it credible. The popular revolt in this country against the use of air power and conventional weapons in Vietnam makes it unlikely, though not certain, that the U.S. will use these means in the future to resist localized Communist pressures.

Are we then left with no choice except Dr. Strangelove or the pacifists? Mutual nuclear annihilation or American surrender? A J. Muste, whom I have always admired but never expected to agree with, used to say, "There is no way to peace. Peace *is* the way." Many students and others who oppose the controlled use of conventional military force in Vietnam seem prepared to adopt the Muste view in all its beautiful simplicity. I would be happy to become a pacifist, too, if only I could believe that the ruling circles in Moscow and Peking shared Mr. Muste's view. Alas, they do not. The abandonment by the U.S. of all forms of intermediate force—if that is the ultimate meaning of Vietnam—will tempt the Communist powers to ever increasing pressure and efforts at encirclement until the U.S. has no choice except to fight a nuclear war or surrender. There is a worse contingency than a small Vietnam-type war.

Jeremy J. Stone

'The thing to do after Vietnam is to tell the truth'

In Vietnam, we practiced to deceive; the web we wove is the measure of that deception. We started from the premise that South Vietnam was a sovereign state, a vital interest, and a free society. By a policy of gradual escalation, we tried to make caution seem implacable tactics in a war of nerves. We pretended that the aggression was clearer in fact and law than it was. We pretended that the South Vietnamese were more unified in resistance than they were. We lied about body counts. We pretended Khe Sanh and Tet were victories and distorted the events in the Tonkin Gulf. We pretended we could not be held responsible for South Vietnamese torture of prisoners or political repression of dissidents. We pretended the U.S. Senate had freely given its authority to the war. We pretended repeatedly that the war could be won rapidly, and bemused ourselves with statistics.

With each deception, fewer and fewer people could keep themselves

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fooled, until finally even the highest officials had to search for historical analogies to maintain their confidence.

The thing to do "after Vietnam" is to tell the truth. Presidents need to be franker about the trap they find themselves in. Cabinet officers must be a little readier to resign. Senators must risk a bit more. And to maintain these standards, integrity must be rewarded and the absence of it condemned. A vigilant public and press have to notice and support acts of political courage so that politicians can survive them.

Because everyone is soberer about peace, a term that covers ambiguously the problems of Vietnam, the Arms Race, and the Middle East, we might get unprecedented support for arms agreements or Middle East settlements after Vietnam. Because the dollar had a scare, we might get world monetary reform. Because the Senate is frustrated and guilty, we might get a revolt against the Armed Services Committee. We are entering a period in which much is possible and little, *a priori*, impossible.

But for some of this, the Vietnamese war must be liquidated in a way that leaves no doubt in the minds of Americans that the war was disaster. This requires no particular outcome, but it does require restraint in post-negotiation claims of victory. Americans still do not understand why Peking thinks it taught us a lesson in Korea; after being pushed back to the Korean "waist" we simply denied that we had entertained hopes of reuniting Korea. The same kind of reevaluation could still lose a hard won lesson.

Even assuming that America has been badly burnt in Vietnam, avoiding a repetition may still require a Senate primed to assert its war powers. The domestic fears of Communist takeovers in Southeast Asia or Latin America are still too strong for any one president. And just as the costs of Korea were ignored in the Vietnamese involvement, a Madison-Avenued compromise in Vietnam might not be an obstacle to another intervention somewhere else.



If we have learned in Vietnam the limits of our power, the next lesson may be the limits of U.S.-Soviet power combined. The Russians and the Third World are even more prone to anticipate a U.S.-Soviet coalition than we are. A joint attempt at political intervention, as for example in the Middle East, might expose a new kind of impotency. As the Russians may be learning in Czechoslovakia, modern-day intervention gets more and more complicated every day, and less and less likely to produce the desired results.

The most dramatic opportunity produced by Vietnam is the live chance to secure a comprehensive U.S.-Soviet arms treaty. Both we and the Russians see a swollen U.S. defense budget being reabsorbed by now traditional strategic weapons industries as men are brought home from Vietnam. And both tend to think that only Vietnam has prevented the conclusion of an agreement. Thus, stored-up expectations for progress may now support unprecedented efforts at cooperation—at least for a time. In terms of the weapon deployment cycles also, both sides are better able to contemplate agreement than ever before in the Cold War. If the Nixon administration plays its cards right, this comprehensive agreement could, by itself, make Nixon's presidency a success.

Carl Oglesby

'Vietnamism has failed . . . The revolution can only be mauled, not defeated'

The underdeveloped world is starving to death, and the disaster which this portends for us all draws upon us at an accelerating rate.

How is it to be deflected or postponed, not even to say averted? What are the starving people of the world supposed to do?

The characteristic response of the underdeveloped world to its own predicament is socialist revolution, this being the means by which an entire population can achieve collective self-modernization.

The advanced world's characteristic response to revolution is Vietnam and the Alliance for Progress. With the first, it announces its refusal to surrender its dominance over the global south. With the second, it confesses that centuries of this dominance have converged upon this half of this century to produce an intolerable social order.

Vietnamism has failed. Generalizing the violence of domination forces the militant unification of the entire victim people. From that point onward, the revolution can only be mauled, not defeated, for the structure of world power relations is such that to invest sufficient energies to destroy the revolution is to open the attacker's flanks to other modes of counterattack. Through the mediations of the world structure of power, Vietnam counterattacked through Europe by means of a Vietnam-induced weakness in the dollar-gold relation, triggering not only Basel, but also sparking the politics of *le défi*, the days of May, etc.

Concurrently, the Alliance fails. More people, less food; higher import prices, lower export earnings; rising debt, shrinking ability to finance the debt; more "crash" programs, more wasted money; more

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American economic penetration, more big American corporations, more U.S.-trained and U.S.-equipped counterinsurgency forces. . . . Very well, everyone knows throughout Latin America, hungrier and more fascist today than when the great *Alianza* adventure began, the appalling melodrama of the "minute-to-midnight" situation has only deepened.

Meanwhile, it has become indubitable—repeat, *indubitable*—that the only Third World countries which stand even a chance of surviving, of pushing themselves into the imperative modernization, are those which have taken the path of violent socialist revolution. Compare the Soviet Union with Eastern Europe, China with India, or Cuba with Hispaniola.

Any human being who is at all interested in staving off the forthcoming defeat of the species must therefore acknowledge one overriding responsibility. *He must do whatever he can to make the revolution more possible.* The irony we must live with lies in this: Failing in this project, we will only have made that revolution inevitable. Succeeding, we will have made it less necessary.

Wilson Carey McWilliams

Military assistance, yes; unconditioned involvement, no

It is a bit premature to ask what will or should happen after Vietnam, and that is a hopeful sign. If one fault stands out in American foreign policy in Vietnam and elsewhere, it is the absence of prematurity, the heavy-handed pragmatism which calls itself "realism" and which, in fact, is a euphemism for drift.

I am quite willing to argue that American intervention in Vietnam, blundering and badly executed though it has been, and unnecessary as it was in a historical sense, has probably prevented even greater dangers and instabilities in Southeast Asia. That, however, is a case which takes more space and time than this symposium allows, and depends on the settlement which eventually ends the war. Fortunately, the present purpose does not require it.

We began and proceeded badly in Vietnam, but not because we "intervened" in the affairs of another state or even because we intervened in a civil war. Intervention is not a policy; it is a fact. American wealth and power are constant invaders of other lands, psychologically if not physically; our currency is the world's medium of exchange; our military potential a constant threat for some and a partial protection for others. Nor can we simply, by some self-denying ordinance, relieve ourselves of the responsibility to use all our powers to produce the ends we hope to achieve.

There is, of course, a debate about what ends these are, and I take it for granted that *Commonweal*'s readers reject the idea of an American crusade against "Communism" and hope for a comparatively peaceful, pluralistic and stable world which affords a maximum of satisfaction and justice to all men and nations.

National insurgency, romanticism aside, *is* a menace to that sort of world, and not simply because it could be a way for the great powers to sneak around the nuclear stalemate. Rather, the vogue of national insurgency requires that all governments in developing states spend more on their military establishments than they can afford, for if the primary means of stopping insurgents lies in removing economic and social causes of discontent, a secondary means is the ability to confront the sniper and the dynamiter with more effective weapons than a land reform bill and persuasive rhetoric. If the developing states spend their substance on arms, there is less to deal with precisely the economic and social needs which can, if frustrated, fuel a serious uprising. And frustration is, in any case, the logic of the new states. Hence the tendency, which has shattered one new democracy after another, to put primary emphasis on a government which can keep order, whatever its other virtues, or want of them. (In shaping a government, James Madison wrote, "you must first enable the government to control the governed," and that reflects the state of mind of the newer "new states" as well as it did our own in 1787.)

All of which means that American military assistance may be a necessity for many states if they are to escape the cycle of military requirements. That may also demand personnel from the U.S. to train new armies in tactics and organization and use of equipment, and that kind of involvement *can* create a situation where we may become involved again.

To avoid the mistaken involvements like Vietnam—not to avoid involvements at all—thus becomes the test of policy. A first, and simple, recommendation is that the United must cease dealing with Asia as a colonial appendage and, as we did with Europe, both require more participation by Asians and concede more to Asian desires for dignity

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and participation in decision-making. America may, for example, have a global "interest" in Vietnam, but Japan has a very empirical one and Japan is a great power—or as much as any state other than the Soviet Union and the United States can be. Japan may have to be conceded the dominant voice in Asian policy, and certainly an equal one. It is high time that at least civilian sovereignty was returned to Japan in Okinawa, and time to consider phasing out our military presence there as well. America has "special relations" with certain Asian states—the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand (at least peripherally part of the continent) and, horribly but inevitably, with Formosa. That demands no more of us than our "special relation" with Britain does on the Continent, a role which involves us as at most *primus inter pares*.

More importantly, we must not allow ourselves to become the psychological and political captives of a regime which is bent on its own political destruction. If—as we always knew in Vietnam—reforms are needed to have any chance of success, we must insist on those reforms being instituted *before* any assistance is made available and we must reserve the right to remove ourselves if the regime backslides at some later date. This is hard; it is an admission of a mistake, and security planners are loath to concede one, yet it is surely safer than our policy in Vietnam. We refused, there, more than one real chance to either escape honorably or to compel the South Vietnamese to make those changes which we were vainly urging with the frail tongue of reason.

This only states a truth of morals and tactics alike: it is foolish to contest—or to be forced to contest—a war of national liberation on behalf of a government which is not worth



defending. In the past, we have often elected to support *any* government because of the realization that few states ever "emerged" from Communism and the secondary fear that the American public would become irrationally militant if they felt we were consistently "losing." (Actually, it might have suggested that we might try a few wars of liberation ourselves —as in Korea or East Germany; fortunately, we have been a bit too responsible for that, though not, alas, in Latin America.) That policy, however, simply allowed our local opponents to pick the time and place for a contest, a dangerous advantage to concede even weak opponents.

Nor, it is clear, will that policy work any more. The greatest "lesson" of Vietnam is that the State Department and other policy planners can no longer ignore the values and ideas of the American liberal-left. In the post-war world, the left was rational and responsible, the right, lunatic and dangerous. Badly burned in the "who lost China?" imbroglio and the McCarthyite aftermath, the policy-makers became unduly sensitive to right-wing irrationalities, assuming—oddly enough—that there was no serious "enemy to the left." It may seem a faint defense of the Vietnam protests to say that whatever their irresponsibilities and irrationalities, they have changed that. Policy-makers will not again assume that only the right's possible reactions are to be feared. At worst, that will produce a healthy caution; at best, it may be a step toward a sunny common-sense policy in which America neither intervenes by reflex nor abstains from dogma, but judges each case by asking whether those we are requested to defend represent a cause worthy of American devotion. Dollars and weapons may be abundant, but guerrilla war has helped to remind us, even in this age, that devotion is still both the strongest and most fragile resource of nations.

Stanley Hoffmann

'A great power cannot treat every tremor as a major threat'

The main lesson we should learn from Vietnam is self-restraint. The policy of world-wide anti-Communist containment we have pursued since the end of World War II did not *have* to get us ensnared in Vietnam; there was no fatality here: our involvement in Vietnam resulted from discrete decisions. But the whole thrust of our policy was to make of the United States the worldwide champion of anti-Communist "stability"; to make us overlook the fundamental distinction between military expansion or subversion by our chief adversaries—Russia and China—and essentially domestic developments in which indigenous Communist or pro-Communist forces quite independent from Moscow or Peking play a part; to make us apply a policy of containment through massive military and economic aid even in parts of the world where it was likely to lead to more, not less, trouble for us and our protégés, because it had worked so well in the special circumstances of Western Europe. Even though we had a choice we acted as if we had had none.

What went wrong in Vietnam? Everything. Given our definition of our objectives—to free South Vietnam of organized Communist penetration—we never had a chance of succeeding at a cost that would not have amounted to the very destruction of the people we were assumed to protect. Our analysis, based on a false analogy with Korea, did not correspond to the

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political realities of South Vietnam. Even if we had recognized that we were faced with a rebellion rather than an invasion, "counter-insurgency" can succeed only when the insurgency is still in its early phases, and when the challenged government still has enough authority and effectiveness to lead its own battle. Otherwise, it becomes a battle between the native rebels and the foreign protector of the challenged government; in such a battle, to quote Raymond Aron, the rebel wins if he doesn't lose, the foreigner loses if he doesn't win. And we couldn't win in Vietnam, both because the costs of victory *in* the South would have meant the destruction *of* the South, and because the costs of massive escalation *outside* the South entailed global risks of large-power confrontation we did not want to face. We didn't, because, in the final analysis, our national interest in Vietnam was not so vital. The superiority of our military might did not compensate for the more compelling quality of the "other side's" interest, i.e., for the greater resolution of the other side, which we consistently and arrogantly minimized.

The lesson we should learn is not only to analyze local realities more realistically, with fewer myths and illusions, so as better to assess our chances of success. It is *also* to curtail drastically the interventionist tendencies of our foreign policy, even in areas where these chances look better. We must revise our national interests. A great power cannot afford to treat every tremor as major threat. We have an interest in preventing a change in the balance of power obtained by our chief adversaries either through aggression or through their strategic policies; but we have no interest in preventing or crushing insurgencies in countries whose flawed political and social systems foster such rebellions. Even if the rebels are Communist or pro-Communist, intervention by the United States is guaranteed only to increase their nationalist, anti-imperialist appeal; only if they are authentically national do they have a chance to succeed; but then, however much of a nuisance their victory may be for us, it would neither change the overall balance of power, nor simplify the task of our main adversaries, already plagued by too much diversity in their fragmented "camp."

This is a world in which nationalism, national self-determination, formal sovereignty, invalidate domino theories. Had we not intervened in Vietnam, Saigon would probably have fallen to the NLF. The result would have been unpleasant for us, but a Communist South or a Communist reunified Vietnam would not have been a Chinese satellite, nor a guarantee of collapse for the rest of Southeast Asia. Indeed, other Southeast Asian countries, rather than strengthening their own societies and defenses, have tended to rely far too much on us. The loss of American prestige due to the failure to prevail in Vietnam will not be any smaller than the loss that would have resulted from a failure to get trapped. In fact, if we now conduct the peace talks in such a way as to extricate ourselves honorably, thanks to the withdrawal of external forces, a peaceful settlement of South Vietnam's future by the various South Vietnamese forces themselves, and with international guarantees for the neutralization of South Vietnam, our prestige might actually soar, as France's did after settling the Algerian war.

In the final analysis, the most important lesson of Vietnam is that moral and political considerations cannot be separated. Self-restraint is today a political as well as a moral imperative for all states, and particularly for the superpowers. The United States, partly by accident, partly through the exuberance of overwhelming power, global and activist principles, and a heady sense of "world responsibility," has ended by acting as an empire, despite all intentions to the contrary. In the process, it is the sense of responsibility , indeed the self-respect of smaller nations, that has been atrophied. We cannot impose on others our inevitably parochial and often disembodied notions of world order and domestic stability. A "realism" that is based, implicitly, on a notion of America's capacity to shape the destiny of others whatever the obstacles is not only unrealistic, it is also derived from moral considerations that are unacceptable. Our good intentions are not what matters; it is our behavior that counts.

Our first task now is not to replace the old crusade of the late 1940s with an anti-crusade that would take the United States out of world affairs, as some people on the New Left seem to want it, but to overcome the old cycle of over-activism followed by retreat, and to aim at a scheme of world order based on true diversity, even at the cost of domestic turbulence. To seek world order by curtailing both wars and revolutions is to court disaster, political and moral. It is inter-state conflict that has to be moderated; this is what we should concentrate on now. New balances of power will have to be encouraged in various parts of the world, with bigger responsibilities for middle-size powers; regional inter-state disputes that could embroil the super-powers will have to be kept under control; the rivalry between the United States and its two chief adversaries will also have to be dampened, especially in the arms arena. The United States must think of its *impact* on others, instead of relying on its material power to *move* others. It is a large enough task, one which requires the substitution of what Pascal called the spirit of finesse for the spirit of geometry (or engineering) that we have exhibited so often.

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THE MEANING OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF

What does it mean to be 'saved'?

LESLIE DEWART

If Christianity were indefinitely to persist in maintaining, in effect, that human consciousness can historically progress in every respect except religiously, Christianity would eventually render itself altogether incredible. It would become all the less credible because it was Christianity itself that, in the first instance, awakened man to consciousness of historical progress. Christianity would not but destroy its credibility if it continued to tell man, as it has for a century or more, that it did not really mean what it had been from the outset effectively preaching as God's Word. Of course, some Christians believe that the Church would, on the contrary, destroy its credibility if it were to acknowledge that to have retained its Hellenic forms, and particularly its Hellenic foundations, over the last century or two, had been in point of fact a mistake. Yet, this position may be dictated by an unhealthy fear rather than by a reasoning one, and by a profound misunderstanding of the nature of error and truth. For the Gospel preached by the Church nowhere contains as an article of belief the doctrine that Greek philosophy (or even Thomistic philosophy) is eternally valid, and that the Hellenic foundations of belief are the indispensable *preambula* to the Christian faith. Nor is Christianity, therefore, married to the Greek (or the Thomistic) philosophy of truth. For the Church to admit honestly, humbly, sincerely and candidly that it was a mistake to have thought so—for a relatively short while—would of itself probably earn only respect and admiration. To uphold the traditional Hellenic forms simply because they were adequate in the past is to take for self-consistency what may be only stubbornness and fear.

In other words, Christianity may well have to learn to abide by the consequences of its own revolutionary ferment upon the human race. The Christian Church will have to take the results of having promised man, I do not say, Heaven, but God himself. One cannot let the Gospel loose in the world and expect that nothing drastic will happen. One cannot tell people that God lives among them and becomes one of them, and that the truth shall make them free, and that death has no sting, and that the *eschaton* of time is at hand and to be hoped for—one cannot, in a word, preach Christ crucified and yet reasonably expect that the world will go on much the same as before. The introduction of the Gospel into the history of man was an evolutionary event. I do not see how anything that anyone should at this late date do, could possibly change that historical fact.

No, man evolved into man—and presumably this did not occur while God was busy elsewhere. And man did not cease to evolve when he evolved into man. Man has evolved, indeed, even since he became civilized. Are we to believe that man has not evolved since he became Christian? He has evolved in modern times, in the last century, and possibly even in our own generation's time. Man has never ceased to evolve, and possibly never will for as long as he is man. And man's religion must evolve with man. Otherwise, religion would cease to be an evolutionary force within man, and this would mean that something had gone wrong with the evolution of man.

The evolution of man has proceeded along the dimension of consciousness. As man has reached certain levels of self-consciousness his nature has gradually changed, and he has increasingly found that he cannot adequately continue to relate himself to reality in the same ways which at earlier times may have been entirely appropriate. Thus, the very nature of the religious situation in which man exists changes as man himself evolves, and the new wine of his religious belief cannot be put into the old skins of traditional forms.

Atheism

Atheism is not only an intrinsic possibility, opened to man by the very nature of his religious situation; it is also an intelligent, albeit inadequate reaction, only partially correct, to the evolution of consciousness. It has been influential and even in a sense progressive, although it is only partially correct, in the absence of any other suggestion that the evolution of religious belief, beginning with the reconceptualization of God, should have been consciously undertaken by man. If atheism should be overcome, it is not because man should fear being alone: if he were in fact alone all he could intelligently do, given his nature, would be to adjust to the fact. Marxist atheism is in this respect highly consistent—even if its consistency is unfortunate in other respects—for it does not bewail the absence of God and instead dedicates itself to the construction of the future of man. Other atheisms are not so worthy of admiration in this particular respect. If God

The above article is an excerpt from LESLIE DEWART*'s forthcoming book,* The Foundations of Belief, *published by Herder and Herder.*

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has no reality it is a little childish to lament his nothingness, to indulge the experience of forlornness, or to wish that things were otherwise. On the other hand, all atheisms are commonly somewhat closer to the mark when they taunt believers with unacknowledged cowardice. A mature person, a person who has taken advantage of the possibilities open to him by the cultural evolution of man to date, should not believe because he is incapable of unbelief—and least of all because he could not otherwise lead a creative and moral life. If, despite the real and avowed possibility of his unbelief, a man stands in belief, understanding belief as an act of fundamental self-conception, ultimate self-disposition and decisive self-projection beyond himself, religion would not be for him a qualification imposed upon human existence from above: religion would be the meaning of his life, vivifying him from within. For such a person to believe would not be really distinct from thinking or from his being what and who he was. To believe in God would not imply submission to a Supreme Being, but self-relation to the reality beyond all being which manifested itself *in* being. The unfathomable mystery which manifests itself *in* being would, at one and the same time, be required for the understanding of being, and require being in order to be understood. Transcendent reality can be believed in only because being can be empirically known. In brief, man is not alone. But man is on his own. The transcendent reality whose company man keeps does not take away any of his responsibilities. On the contrary, man acquires responsibility because he exists in the presence of God.

The Quest for Salvation

True and valid religious belief, sufficient unto salvation, is neither natural nor rational, if this means that human nature and reason, sufficient unto themselves according to their intrinsic necessities, are also sufficient to transcend their intrinsic necessities and rape the inner necessities of God. I have no doubt that the traditional Christian distaste for naturalism and rationalism is perfectly well taken—but I stress that their diametric opposite, supernaturalism and obscurantism, hobble human development with comparable efficiency, and that diametric opposition to naturalism and rationalism commit one to an acceptance of the pessimistic, closed, Greek concept of nature, and of the uncritical, circular, Greek concept of reason. But true and valid religious belief is natural and rational if nature is freedom, given to man by the situation in which he exists in the presence of God, and if reason is his means of self-orientation towards the future, of self-projection towards God and of self-disposition in favour of all reality. In this sense, the Christian faith in God coincides perfectly with faith in nature and with faith in reason. (I presuppose here, of course, that reality is not to be identified with being, nor reason with the intussusception of that-which-is.)

Religious belief leads to "salvation." But what precisely is it to be "saved"? This question underlies every religious enquiry. If the answer were simple or clear, religious reflection would lack its motive power. (I do not mean, of course, that religious reflection is necessarily a form of self-seeking, at least intelligent self-seeking. It is true, on the other hand, that it can become self-seeking—



for instance if it were to conceive salvation as survival over disasters which one wishes to avoid at all costs, even, if necessary, as a privileged individual would, whose happy fate need not shared by anyone else.) Perhaps the beginning of wisdom is the thought that it is not easy to know what a man must do to be "saved." The answer to the perennial problem of self-problematic man is not self-evident above all because the problem is not that of finding an elusive, or presently unavailable, means to an otherwise clearly delimited, and obviously all valuable, end. The problem is indeed almost precisely the opposite. For we may be certain that, regardless of the nature of whatever we may project ourselves towards with ultimate and total self-commitment, the means to achieve it are perfectly clear and available to everyone: the means can only be the exercise of our free, creative existence in the presence of God. But the problem is that it is not so very easy to give a concrete shape to the central, final project of our total life. Nor must we suppose that the concrete form of this project must be the same for everyone: to each life or creative freedom corresponds a vocation, (which is itself subject to evolution throughout life), which is not definable from the outset and which can be understood only to the extent that it is realized, and which must therefore be undertaken not under the sign of certainty, (rational or religious), but only under the sign of faith, hope and love.

Evidently, then, "salvation" is not a question of finding out in what may consist one's ultimate "safety," one's ultimate rescue from an inhospitable situation or from a dangerous or frustrating world. On the contrary, it is rather a question of finding out what is a truly worthwhile risk. It is, (if I may be forgiven a capitalistic, but instructive, metaphor), a question of finding out what constitutes a wise investment of one's existence. The traditional metaphor, "salvation," was understandably applicable at that level of human development when man naturally and concretely perceived his situation within real-

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ity as fraught with dangers lurking beyond the range of his effective control. This is not quite so true today—at least, we can glimpse the threshold of a world when the danger of the human situation will have been, by and large, taken away, and when the world shall have become a fairly safe place for every man. This is in some respects already true: the hostility of the situation of man today, at least in the more advanced cultures, does not come from without as much as from within, not so much from external forces as from evil possibilities inherent to man. We no longer need fear hunger, pestilence, disease, poverty and abject ignorance: though we have not nearly eradicated these, it is not because we do not know how. The major blocks in the way of universal health and prosperity belong strictly to the order of human self-organization. But we are threatened by disorder in this very respect: what we may fear is self-destruction, genocide, boredom, despair, moral overcommitment, cultural demoralization, institutionalized anarchy, and self-induced hallucinations on a national if not also global scale.

(One of the gravest threats to contemporary international political stability [and, hence, to the survival of man] derives from the obsolescence of political institutions which make it perfectly possible for an extremely small number of men to take irrevocable decisions that affect the human race as a whole and commit on a moment's toss the very existence of man, without providing at the same time nearly enough safeguards against the possibility, if not indeed the likelihood, that the corresponding selective processes may be so biased that they would frequently place men in political situations which are above their intellectual and moral depth.) Perhaps, then, we should move away from the question of "salvation" and ask ourselves instead: how can man find ultimate meaning in conscious existence freely undertaken? How can I best discharge the final and total responsibility in which I am placed by being conscious that I exist? In what way should I definitively orient myself, as I discover that the definitiveness of human temporality is given by the termination of life in death?

It is almost as easy to be carried away by realism as by piety. It is indispensable to recall at this point that it would be the worse part of realism—one scarcely needs faith to be persuaded of this—to forget that, whatever the future may hold, there is much wrong with man today. I mean, not only with individuals, but with the human race. There is an absurd, ridiculous disparity between the abstract and the concrete possibilities open to man, between what man can dream of and what he can actually bring about. Christian optimism would be imprudent, it would be unrealistic and foolhardy, if it imagined (as Marxist utopianism inveterately does) that this disparity could be overcome without the elevation of man towards the transcendent reality of God. Progress will not remedy the generic condition of man unless it be progress in man's relation to God.

The perfection of human nature *may* be achieved; it will not be *inevitably* achieved. Man is invited, challenged to progress. Progress is normal and natural to him insofar as he is impelled to evolve by the actual situation in which he exists—for instance, by his nature as conscious, which automatically leads him to become conscious of himself precisely as conscious, and hence to create himself consciously and in awareness that the very possibilities that will be opened to him in the future depend upon what he does with himself today. But progress obtains through man's free self-creation: it is, therefore, far from assured. Human existence can, quite possibly, ultimately fail. But even if the adventure of man ends in disaster, the Christian can be certain that it will not end in tragedy. For the possibility of its success was as real and as indeterminate as that of its failure. Heaven and Hell do not await man. Heaven and Hell are created by man's arrival at them.

Hence, the "restoration" of man to his "proper" condition is to be achieved only through the creation of a world made in the divine presence and decisively guided by the historical agency of God. But this is scarcely a *re*-storation, and man's attainment of it is not proper to him. It is not a restoration, because the evolution of man is not a return, but an ascent, to God. And it is not proper of him, because it is not an ascent to his own. For God does not belong to man—not only because man never possessed him, but also because man may yet fail in his attempt to ascend to God. Human nature is not ready-made; it is on the way, evolving towards a goal which can be truly realized, but which was not pre-set from the first. The goal itself is creatively determined within man's evolutionary history in the presence of a historically active God.

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CAROL JOHNSON

THE NEW WORLD

An infant spider steps round my camembert
and apple core, imperturbably
rich in purpose, shortly to disappear
under seven weeks' letters, notebooks and old poems
the very likeness of scholarly demeanor.
My two cats meanwhile dance madly and leap after
a gull's feather already tattered, so lightly
made glad, high jumping as ever at this far
side of the world.

Near the mutable water's edge
rain stammers on our roof; the cold pacific
pores repetitiously over our pebbly strand,
and reckless ducks ride out with professional calm
the sliding sea's renewing tremors: home.

We look out and it reads us like a poem.

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As the smoke clears

ISSUES FOR THE '70s

HARVEY COX

With Richard Nixon barely in office two months, and most people breathing a slight sigh that although his appointments were not very colorful they at least were not disastrous, it might seem too early for those of us who hustled for Bobby or got clean for Gene to talk about regrouping. But in politics it is never too soon to regroup, or at least to sort out how the issues are shaping up for the next big charge. How does the battlefield appear as the smoke clears?

First of all it seems evident that the Democratic party will probably never recover its full strength again. Inside the South it is a declining feudal remnant with only a Julian Bond here and there to mitigate the gloom. In the North it is a minority. It has lost most of the major state houses. In nearly all the large populous states at least one and usually both senators are Republicans. It is impossible today to speculate on whether the Democratic party can ever again summon the coherence and strength to win a national election and lead the country. Therefore what we must concentrate on now are the *issues* of the next five to ten years, suspending for the moment the question of what organization can carry these issues into a political program. As I see it, there are three major issues, or perhaps better stated, three fundamental questions out of which issues must be developed. It is around these issues that our thinking should be organized in the months to come.

1. The first question is how all the talk about the movement "from quantity to quality" as the major concern of the society can be expressed in political terms. Everyone from the Sierra Society to the New Left agrees that quality is now the major issue. Of course we need *more* schools, *more* housing, *more* welfare—but the real question is a deeper one. How can we improve the quality of what we've got?

My suspicion is that the political answer to this question will come in the form of the growing discussions about decentralization. Formerly the property mainly of such utopian and radical writers as Staughton Lynd, Paul Goodman and Gar Alperowitz, decentralization is now moving from cliché to program. At Harvard and MIT last semester forty young scholars at the graduate student and young professor level worked in four task groups on the problem of how decentralization would look in the major areas of domestic policy, especially in housing, education, community development and municipal services. Roxbury already has a small community-controlled parallel school system. In February, Washington's Institute for Policy Studies, where for years Milton Kotler has been advocating a thoroughgoing decentralization of American society, opened a Cambridge equivalent. Actual pilot programs in decentralization are about to begin.

Of course no one believes that all our national problems can be solved simply by redistributing power to lower levels. Some can only be solved at regional and national levels. But if we were to assemble an inventory of our society's needs and then assign them to the levels where they could be most appropriately addressed, my own suspicion is that many more could be approached at the local level—even at the ward and neighborhood level—than we now believe.

Restoring Vitality

Professor Karl Fox, Head of the Economics Department at Iowa State University, for example, argues persuasively that our large metropolitan conglomerates have now reached such a size that simply from the economic point of view they should be broken down into more viable sub-areas. Educators are talking about community schools and decentralization. Political theorists are discussing how to restore the vitality to ward level politics. Recreation experts are now interested in "community commons" and vest pocket parks. In every area it is clear that our society's historic movement toward centralization has gone about as far as it should. But how to sharpen the *political* issues involved in decentralization remains a difficult problem.

2. The second major question we must face is how we hear and respond effectively to the growing disquietude of the ethnic, blue-collar voters of America. These are the people who have been forced by middle and upper-middle class Americans to pay most of the bill for solving America's racial mess. These are the people who see open-housing laws affecting them more than they affect the rich, and they are right.

Open housing in a tract of $45,000 houses means something different than it does in a tract of $18,000

HARVEY COX *writes a regular column for these pages. His most recent book is* On Not Leaving It to the Snake.

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houses. The forced integration of urban schools affected the white inner city dweller much more than it did the gallant suburbanite who supported it. Even equal job opportunities and benevolent discrimination for blacks in city colleges operates at the cost of ethnic minorities and blue collar workers more than of well-to-do whites. These taxi drivers, stevedores and firemen are now in open revolt. If it had not been for Curtis LeMay many more might have voted for George Wallace. Responding to the political challenge they represent is one of the most intriguing political tasks of our time.

For too long now American liberals have nursed their grudge against rednecks, racist blue collar workers and VFW-oriented ethnic minorities. We have labeled them racist and jingoistic. By now it should have become clear that their racism runs no deeper than the average liberal's —it just has more occasions to be displayed.

Nor is the current liberal pastime of blaming riots on the police more well grounded. The police are simply blue collars with guns. Like other blue collar groups they have been pushed by the society into a position where they must feel threatened by black people. In the old *divide et impera* strategy cops and cab drivers have been turned against the people who should be their allies —those who seek fundamental change in the society. The cops, as Dick Gregory says, have become the niggers of today. He might have added that lower class whites have become the scapegoat for America's racism and superpatriotism.

But the people who live in our over-mortgaged, under-serviced blue collar ghettos are also dissatisfied. They know their schools are inferior. They know they pay a stiffer price for higher interest rates, inflation, Vietnam casualties than do their better off white counterparts across the tracks. They resent the destruction of their neighborhoods for thruways and airports. They suspect, with a high degree of accuracy, that most politicians are in the game for what they can carry home with them. To mold the discomfort they feel into issues which can lead to change rather than bitter *resentment* is the task we now face.

3. There is a third question-asking-for-an-issue. It grows out of the indisputable fact that anti-Communism is no longer a credible premise for foreign policy even among those groups who used to espouse it. When one reviews the rhetoric used by the Vietnam hawks it is interesting to notice that even there precious little old-style red-menace imagery remains. We are in Vietnam, they say, to preserve our national interest, or to protect a small country against invasion. Soldiers tell me that no one in the army takes the anti-Communist line very seriously, not even the trainers who use it in boot camp briefing sessions. Though a spark remains here and there, the once-pulsating flame of anti-Communism does not ignite much sentiment nowadays. When did you last see anyone picketing Polish hams?

This development is a natural one. Five years ago scholars were talking about polycentrism in the Communist world and national revisionism in Europe. Since then the recognition that we do not really face a worldwide, tightly organized Communist conspiracy at all has trickled down into the consciousness of even the average newspaper reader. A Communist prime minister in Czechoslovakia has become something close to a folk hero for many Americans. GI's come back from Vietnam with a grudging admiration for "Charley" and nothing but contempt for most of the South Vietnamese troops they have met. But the final tipoff that the mood in America had changed when it comes to red revolutionaries was the announcement by Twentieth Century Fox that it will be releasing in 1969 a film entitled "Che!" When Castro's friend Che Guevara becomes the vehicle for a Hollywood film clearly designed to make money, it is clear that Fourth of July anti-Communism and red-scare rhetoric can no longer provide the planks for a political program.

The Future

But what now? Dean Rusk tells us he is worried about a new wave of isolationism in America when the Vietnam war is over. And well he might be. His elephantine errors in judgment have persuaded many people that as soon as we can get out of Vietnam honorably we should retreat to our shores, build a sweet little nest, and let the rest of the world go by. But isolationism is neither practical nor possible in a supersonic world. We must reject it along with the three premises which have provided the intellectual bases for twenty-five years of American foreign policy: rebuilding Europe, containing Communism, and maintaining political stability in poor countries so that economic development can take place.

All three of these concepts are now useless. Europe is long since rebuilt. Containment has been exposed as a negative and inflexible policy. And it is now clear that really solid economic development cannot take place under military dictatorships and generals' juntas no matter how stable they appear. The UN's decade of development has been a flop and the Alliance for Progress so far has produced no significant change in Latin America. The gap between food production and population growth there is greater than ever and we have more military dictatorships south of the Rio Grande than we have had at any time this century.

Still Americans can be excited by what is happening overseas. They feel for the besieged people of Biafra. They admire the courageous students of Prague. They retain an interest in India. They will go see a movie about Che. The question is how can the basically generous feelings of most Americans, their admiration for the underdog, their commitment to equality, their belief that everyone should have a fair chance—how can these

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basic American attitudes be matched with the complex issues of today's world to produce a coherent and consistent foreign policy?

Most Americans are really not overly fond of giant corporations. Will it be possible to make the constrictive role of such titans in, say, Latin America, an issue that will actually win votes? Would Americans support a foreign policy that stood on the side of fundamental change in the poor world rather than one which opposes every revolution as a red conspiracy? Can such ventures as the Peace Corps be truly internationalized so the volunteers return home with a commitment to work at home for the kinds of changes that will make a real difference in the poor countries?

By 1970 the country will be ready for candidates who come to the people with issues that vibrate with the hopes and fears they feel inside. Such candidates will have to talk about real decentralization—returning large segments of power to the lower levels from which it has been expropriated during the liberal era. They will have to catch the imagination of that vast sea of blue collar workers whose checks never last until the next pay day and who resent the people Up There who make so many decisions for them. Finally, next year's candidates will have to articulate a vision of America's role in the world which leaves behind the clichés of anti-Communism and brings American resources to the service of change. With these issues in hand we'll be ready to do battle again.

TREBLE AT RCA

RECORDS

Whether there has ever been a jazz instrumentalist who operated incandescently in jazz improvisation and could also operate effectively in a performance of the written notes of a work by Mozart; or whether there *can* be a jazz instrumentalist capable of both these achievements—I don't know. But about Benny Goodman I know that he isn't capable of either. When he first recorded Mozart's Clarinet Quintet with the Budapest Quartet thirty years ago, he had managed to become a celebrated jazz clarinetist, but not a good one—in tone, in phrasing, in improvisatory invention. And in the Mozart piece he produced only successions of undifferentiated notes, not phrases in which the notes were brought into relation to one another by differentiating inflection. After thirty years—in the performances of Mozart's Clarinet Concerto with the Boston Symphony under Munch and his Clarinet Quintet with the orchestra's first-desk strings, on an RCA Victrola stereo record—he has learned to make notes louder and softer than others; but he is miles from achieving the lovely tone and the sensitive inflection of this tone in coherent phrases that one hears in De Peyer's recorded performances of the works. Nor does he play in Weber's Concertos Opp. 73 and 74—with the Chicago Symphony under Martinon on a Victor stereo record—with anything like the beautiful tone and musical grace of Leister's performance of Op. 73.

Mozart's Quartet K.458 (*Hunt*), with its delightfully high-spirited opening movement and deeply affecting slow movement, and his fine Quartet K.465 are on a Westminster stereo record, performed well by the Allegri Quartet. Much additional bass is needed for adequate cello sound; and K.458 comes off the record with an occasional scraping noise.

A charming early piece by Schubert, the Sonata Op. 162 for violin and piano, and the even earlier Sonatinas Op. 137, of which the seldom-played No. 2, with its remarkable first movement, is superior to the other two, are on a low-priced World Series record (pseudo-stereo, but good), excellently performed by Grumiaux and Castagnone.

And the superb Polish pianist Harasiewicz's performances of Chopin's Polonaises Opp. 26, 40, 44 and 53 and Polonaise-Fantaisie Op. 61 are on a World Series stereo record. My copy produces piano sound that buzzes in loud passages.

The delicate, lovely-sounding playing that Gilels does in the performances of Beethoven's five piano concertos with the Cleveland Orchestra, on Angel stereo records, is preferable to the pounding he used to do; but it is much of the time a blandly fluent playing, whereas the music—even the early writing of the first two concertos—calls for an energy which Gilels exhibits only in some of the powerful moments of the later three. I recommend instead, therefore, Glenn Gould's performances of the first three, Fleisher's of No. 4 (on the record with Mozart's K.503), Cliburn's of No. 5.

One of the less well known of the impressive masses that Haydn wrote in his last years, the *Heiligmesse* (*Missa Sancti Bernardi de Offida*), is performed well, on an Argo stereo record, by George Guest with the Choir of St. John's College, Cambridge, a solo quartet comprising April Cantelo, Shirley Minty, Ian Partridge and Christopher Keyte, and the Academy of St. Martin-in-the-Fields.

Another work that is not well known is Carl Phillip Emanuel Bach's *Magnificat,* in which his mind operates with impressive force in the lively sections and achieves beautiful and affecting writing in the slow ones—most notably in the aria *"Suscepit Israel."* The work is performed effectively on a Victrola stereo record by Elly Ameling, Maureen Lehane, Theo Altmeyer, Roland Hermann and the Tölzer Boy Choir with the Collegium Aureum under Kurt Thomas' direction.

The 1953 Florence May Festival performance of Donizetti's *Lucia di Lammermoor* with Callas, Di Stefano

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and Gobbi, superior to every recorded performance since then, and available in recent years only on imported Odeon records, has been issued here again on low-priced Seraphim mono records.

Also reissued on Seraphim mono records is the 1951 Bayreuth Festival *Meistersinger,* which is for those who are willing to accept a surprisingly poor orchestra, the erratic and at times ineffective conducting of von Karajan, and Hans Hopf's hard-voiced, unlyrical Walther for the sake of Schwarzkopf's beautifully sung Eva and Edelmann's fine Sachs. I advise acquiring instead the excellent performance of this beautiful work on Angel records with Grümmer, Frantz, Schock and the Berlin Philharmonic, conducted by Kempe.

The term 'overwhelming' applied to Toscanini's performance of Wagner's *Götterdämmerung* by those who heard it at the Metropolitan is made understandable by the tremendous performance of Siegfried's Funeral Music reissued on a Victrola mono record last year, and by the performance of the concluding Immolation Scene with Helen Traubel now issued on another mono Victrola. I remember the delight with which he listened in 1942 to the test pressing of the superbly reproduced performance; and I can imagine his explosion of fury if he heard it accompanied on the Victrola record by what sounds like a strong sustained organ pedal note. Inquiry from Victor elicited information that the editor had made the new transfer not from the 78-rpm original but from the first LP transfer, LCT-1116, which had not only cuts in treble and bass range that reduced the brilliance and solidity of the original sound but a slight bass hum (not in the original); and that this slight hum had been magnified by the bass boost he had given the sound of LCT-1116—despite which he had left the bass boost in. In 1953, when Victor issued the 1941 Toscanini-Philadelphia Orchestra Schubert Ninth and I reported hearing a treble cut which the editor in that instance, Peter Dellheim, found to have been an accident in the transfer, he made a new transfer and replaced the defective first pressings with new ones, causing me to write that I was dumbfounded by my first experience of such admirable behavior by a record company. But in the present instance the editor, Robert Zarbock (who, instructed to put the original sound of Toscanini's recordings on the Victrola records, added treble boosts to most of them and used an inferior working tape instead of the marvelous original of the Beethoven Eighth), would not correct the defect of the Immolation Scene, and was not reversed by the Manager of Red Seal, Roger G. Hall (who earlier had expressed his approval of Mr. Zarbock's dealing with the Beethoven Eighth and the other Toscanini Victrola reissues). And so—not for the first time—the corporate entity RCA Victor bears publicly the responsibility for a scandalously defective record produced by an individual decision not only deficient in competence but in artistic conscience.

B. H. HAGGIN

IF YOUTH BUT KNEW

THE SCREEN

It was Browning who said, "Let age approve of youth," but I doubt if movie makers have Browning in mind in their present cycle of films about youth. The current trend seems to be showing young people in a light that wins tut-tutting from oldsters rather than approval. And it's time we did a run-down of these movies on youth about whom Browning did *not* make the wisecrack concerning youth being so wonderful that it's a shame it is wasted on the young.

Certainly one of the best items in this youth cycle is "If. . . ." an English movie directed by Lindsay Anderson whose "This Sporting Life" won huzzahs several years ago for its fascinating combination of stark realism and imaginative, almost poetic, film making. "If. . . .", set in a boys' public (we'd call it private) school, goes even farther in mixing realism, surrealism, and flights of fantasy in the world of boys, according to Anderson, when they are most separated from the world; but this world of boys often mirrors "the world we think of as adult." Handsomely photographed in a school in Gloucestershire, England, the picture starts as the boys return to the college for the winter term. In episodic fashion Anderson introduces us to the boys, their banter, their way of life, their hazing, the cruelty of the boys to each other, the snobbery and meanness of the student prefects toward the boys, and the school itself with its aged buildings and rooms dominated by the Establishment who are smothered in tradition and clichés.

"If. . . ." has no one hero but our main concern is with three seniors, Mick and his two buddies who are a little more imaginative in their play and planning and are all set for rebellion. When the three are severely caned by the head student prefect, they intensify their schemes and dreams. They try out their revolt by using bullets in their rifles during military games and wound the chaplain. The Headmaster finds this very serious indeed and gives them further punishment: the cleaning of the very dirty basement—where the three boys find, to their delight, some ammunition left from World War II. The end of the film is a real shocker.

Actually "If. . . ." does not prepare us for the startling finale, but the film is so fascinating as it runs from scene to scene and so skillfully directed by Anderson that we sit stunned at the end whether or not we are supposed to accept what happens as real or imaginary. Earlier the picture has shown us some fanciful episodes (Mick and a friend stealing a motorcycle, Mick grappling with a waitress and suddenly both of them are naked, the chaplain turning up in a large chest drawer when the Head bawls out the boys after the shooting, and most startling,

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the shots of the house master's wife walking stark naked through the school corridors). Anderson gives us no clue whose imagination is running wild in these brief scenes, perhaps Mick's, perhaps all of the students', or perhaps Anderson's—as if to say if so-and-so happens, then this fanciful so-and-so could happen.

There are no star actors in "If. . . ." but the performances throughout are amazingly convincing; and while much of this material has been done before, I doubt if it's ever been done better. Oldsters set in their ways won't be happy with the picture's drastic finale, but they should be willing to play the game of "If. . . ." and if they do they will be well rewarded. Young people, anxious to work off some of their peeves against the Establishment, will no doubt revel in this amazing exercise in release.

Next week we shall go on to visit a girls' school in "The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie" and more boys' schools in some other movies. Tea and sympathy, anyone?

PHILIP T. HARTUNG

JOSEPHINE JACOBSEN

THE SHADE-SELLER

"Sombra?"
he asked us from his little booth. And shade
we bought to leave our car in.

By noon
the sand was a mealy fire; we crossed by planks
to the Revolcadero's sea.

One day
we were later and hotter; and he peered out
and "No hay sombra!" he told us.

That day
when we came back to our metal box, frightened
we breathed for a terrible instant

the air,
fiery and loud, of the hooked fish.
Quick! Quick! Our silver key!

Sometimes
now I dream of the shade-seller; from his dark
he leans, and "Sombra . . ." I tell him.

There is
candescent sand and the great noise of heat
and it is I who speak that word

heavy
and wide and green. O may he never,
peering, speak three words.

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MALOFF/WRITERS & WRITING

TROPIC OF CONVERSATION

Almost before it was written, Philip Roth's *Portnoy's Complaint* was a celebrated book. Or to put it more temperately: for many months before it appeared as a book, while it still existed only as a series of fragments scattered over several magazines, "everybody" (as the admen say) "was talking about it." There was nothing spurious about its fame: there were no teaser ads, no splashy publicity campaigns, no wild rumors—though there was a good deal of chatter, which turned out to be generally reliable, about funny amounts of money (publisher's, reprinter's, movie producer's) changing hands—enough to finance a middle-size emergent nation.

Portnoy's Complaint
PHILIP ROTH
Random House, $6.95

Money and fame, like sex, are exciting subjects, and in quite the same way: if you were to observe through a plate-glass window a random group of people talking about all three, serially or in clusters, I'd venture you couldn't guess which was causing palpitations and flushed complexions at any given moment. Inevitably, then, some of the "talk" about the novel was extraliterary, not to say frivolous; some of it was nostalgic and reminiscential (Ah, yes, that's how it was with us when we were boys); and some of it was clinical—even culinary (a girl asked me earnestly if that's what boys did with calf's liver, to which I was compelled to reply, earnestly, not when *I* was a boy—liver was far too expensive). But to a heartening degree, once confessions had been exchanged, or competitively invented, the purely literary excitement generated by those fragments (roughly two-thirds of the book) arose from a sense that a remarkably gifted and resourceful writer had struck a bursting vein of the inaccessible motherlode, the upper and upper-nether layers of which Jewish novelists have been mining for a generation; that Roth, suicidally heedless of what the neighbors might say or think, had undertaken to tell some of the remaining unmentionable home truths—about Mama and Papa, self and sex, toilet and kitchen table, everything, now, all at once; and that, above all, he had hit upon the exact enabling form for discovery and revelation of the sort of truths he was dealing with—the nonstop, solo spilling-out of the jammed "material" of a lifetime before an ideal audience of one, the silent, shadowy, possibly unlistening, professionally unjudging, all-accepting psychoanalyst, for whom everything—*everything*—is so much grist for the mill. To spill it all out is the point both of analysis and of art.

Among other advantages, the form allows Roth to finesse all sorts of objections that may be entered, most of them about Portnoy himself. Is Mama too much of a carnivorous ogre, the castrator with knife (literally) in hand? Of course she is—but analysis is no place for balanced accounts. Of course the hapless, inept Papa is seen too exclusively as the sorrowful comedian who would trade life eternal for one really consummate bowel movement in the here and now. And of course Portnoy himself is a grotesque—the tireless adolescent masturbator who grew up, or down, to become a full-time rat with women, a gymnast with some pretty peculiar tastes and an uncanny sense of smell, a case of arrested development if ever there was one, and all because of Sophie and Jake Portnoy, who wanted only the best of everything for their only son and cherished hope, I.Q. 158, as beautiful and brilliant a boy as ever spilled his seed on the westbound 107 bus.

Certainly he's a grotesque; he tells us that all the time; if he weren't, he wouldn't be "in therapy." Certainly this is the original volatile mass—the source, the beginning, the great cloud—from which ten thousand fully armed Jewish jokes sprang. Portnoy knows he is sinking and may drown in the middle of a Jewish joke. He cries it out, with his heart's blood. When the joke has come full circle, when this engine of destruction with all other women, providing they are Gentile (at the same time coveted, yearned-for, forbidden, and in their mothers' womb already radically soiled), when Portnoy proves impotent in Israel, outcast in Haifa and then is violently rebuffed by a six-foot sabra who looks a little like Sophie around the eyes and mouth and reads him a lecture on socialist morality while he lunges futilely for her unassailable if not impregnable fortress—when he is thus finally reduced, and the joke is over, Portnoy turns himself in to Dr. Spielvogel, to whom nothing human or animal is alien. The joke and the novel end in a photo finish; and when they end, when the life has been vomited up and the analytic material made available, Spielvogel, whose turn it now is, speaks his one historic line. Therapy is about to begin; the decks are cleared for action; the prospect of a "cured" Portnoy, ingathered in the Holy Land, potent in Zion, upright in Eretz Yisrael, looms on the farthest horizon, a thousand hours in the future.

But there will be no sequel, of course; art ends where therapy begins, and where therapy ends there can be no art. A "healed" Portnoy, assimilated at last to the safe haven of "normal healthy genitality" is no fit subject for art—nor, one is almost tempted to say, for life either. He would be what he sometimes dreams of becoming when the flesh, his and hers and theirs, is too much with him—a man rather like his father, married to a woman rather like his mother, tuned in with children rather like himself to his favorite radio (now TV)

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programs. Decorously face to face with his wife in a totally darkened room, once a week (on Saturday night), he will put childish things from him and attain full manhood, become, in his own gamy estimation, another "shtunk," in fact a kind of goy; and on Sunday morning he will play softball with the boys. Indeed, at his weakest and most sentimental, Portnoy (and Roth) almost yields, cravenly, to this splendid American dream of the easiest way out.

None of the foregoing really conveys the singular quality of Roth's novel. Although there are "redeeming social values" in generous profusion—of narrative drive and comic vitality, of lunatic wit and that murderous precision of social observation that has always been Roth's birthright—let's not distract ourselves with apologetic cant. *Portnoy's Complaint* is a desperately dirty novel; and that, like it or not, is its chief joy and aesthetic principle. In order to impart some sense of its central and pervasive quality, one would have to scald this page with an assaultive spilling-out of all the famous words and phrases which—despite all fatuous (and disingenuous) disclaimers about how "boring" they are in their insane and brutal repetitiveness—have never lost their ancient power to shock and appall, repel and magnetize, disgust and delight, disclose and illuminate, for better or worse; which is to say they have never, in the hands of a master, lost any of their old power to perform the full work of a literary language.

Roth, true to his origins as a city rat blessed with a golden ear (for obscenity is the urban poetry), is a past master: in his hands, or mouth, obscenity—which can be, if ineptly employed, just as base as any other language ineptly employed (but no more or less so)—becomes a powerful and supple, immensely expressive speech—not only an insistent, surprising music but an essential means of feeling, experiencing, knowing. And this holds true—theoretically unacceptable as this will surely seem to some, though, in that case, they need only spare themselves the trouble and pain of reading the book—of the rendition of pornographic scenes, which provide, again and again, moments of boisterous comedy of a furious liveliness that reduces one to helpless—even to involuntary—laughter.

Involuntary because guilty: "we" aren't the sort of people who laugh, who derive pleasure from, such things. But of course we are; *good* pornography—by which I mean, simply, works of art of a special order—by bringing us smack up against them will not allow us to escape our own universal fantasies and rejected nature. They reveal our secrets, and part of the pleasure we derive from them is the pleasure of meeting ourselves again. Because, among other things, it forces that encounter, *Portnoy's Complaint* is a liberating book. Alexander Portnoy—poor Alex—is an awful mess; but in his confusions is our clarity. What Bellow did for money as a literary subject in *Seize the Day*, Roth does for sex down and dirty: he brings it into the scope of the contemporary novel, and all but uses it up.

Down and dirty—this must be insisted upon, for when the backlash sets in, there may be something of a clamor that this time Roth has gone too far: enough is enough, but sick is sick. Why can't Portnoy be nicer? Why must so many of our most gifted writers be impossible all the time? Why won't some of them save the day—time, as always, is running out—by reassuring us with pleasant tales of "normal, healthy" occasional and hygienic consolation between consenting heterosexuals. But it is, at the very least, worth pondering that wholesome "interpersonal relations" make for generally bad art, just as happy marriages do: they may be marvelous to engage in but they are not, alas, likely to be very interesting. And in any event, for the ends of art, if not of life—a fearful dilemma, there is no gainsaying—erotic relations (I have in mind by that fancy term sex and the thousand *disguises* of sex) are not "normal" and "healthy" (which is a touch of what the masters of modern literature have been trying convulsively to tell us for a century); they are demonic and dirty, funny and grotesque, lethal or liberating: in a word, *vital*. Poor Portnoy boils with the vital essence: he is most turbulently alive when he screams loudest from way down below, and his misfortune is our good luck.

SAUL MALOFF

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

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BOOKS

Two books, one question: Was Jesus a zealot?

Jesus and the Zealots

S. G. F. BRANDON

Scribners, $7.95

The Trial of Jesus of Nazareth

S. G. F. BRANDON

Stein & Day, $6.95

JOHN L. McKENZIE

My first complaint about these two books is that they are two versions of the same thesis. The same material and the same argumentation are used in both; the second title bows to "the general reader" by having its less generous documentation gathered in one section at the rear of the book, and by a slightly more modest price. My second complaint forms the main body of the review; and this complaint is directed against the thesis that Jesus was a zealot. B. will regard this review as a theological answer to a historical question. I am sorry about that, deeply, but I do not think it is a fair criticism for an author to use on reviewers before they have done their work. It will be my task to show that B. has not presented a historical thesis which can be submitted to objective historical criticism.

It is not much of a compliment to a man to say that he is not another Schonfield, and I would not want this non-compliment to stand as a summary of my judgment. B. is a scholar, and he is honest; and these two words sum up the difference briefly and clearly. He is professor of comparative religion at the University of Manchester. He has control of the erudition necessary to discuss the question, and he generally handles it objectively.

No one can quarrel with the fact that the Gospel narratives of the trial and death of Jesus are unsatisfactory to the historian; they contain a number of difficult variations, they do not reflect the experience of eye-witnesses, and they are evidently incomplete. But it is more than a small leap from this to the conclusion that Jesus was a zealot. It should be noticed that this is not simply a rehashing of the thesis that Jewish leaders had nothing to do with the death of Jesus. B. begins with what he calls the embarrassing fact that Jesus was executed by the Romans for sedition. He might have noticed that the Gospels omit, among other things, any explicit statement of the charge on which Jesus was condemned. This inconsistency is explained in the Gospels themselves as due to Jewish pressure on Pilate. Like many others, B. finds the story of this pressure incredible and out of character not only with Roman administration in general but with the character of Pilate, in particular as this character is known from Josephus. I am indebted to *Jesus and the Zealots*, pp. 72-73, for a citation from Philo Judaeus, *Legatio ad Gaium*, which describes Pilate as acting in a totally different situation exactly in the way in which he appears in the Gospels. How B. missed this I do not know, except that a thesis sometimes makes it unnecessary to examine all the evidence. Maybe Mark is not credible; maybe Philo is not credible; maybe Josephus is not credible; but let us deal with the question critically.

The arguments for the zealot thesis are subtle and a brief summary will not do them justice. B. finds evidence in the Gospels that the Jewish Christianity of Jerusalem was a faith in Jesus as a nationalist Messiah. Mark found it necessary to detach Jesus from Jewish zealotism, in order to assure Roman Christians against an anti-Jewish terror which must be assumed. For this it is necessary to date Mark rather precisely in 71, the year of the Flavian triumph. Mark was not consciously and deliberately mendacious; before Mark wrote at all the Gentile Gospel of Paul had become the Gospel of the Gentile churches, and this Gospel had de-Judaized Jesus already. But it had not met the embarrassment of the Roman execution. The other Gospels followed Mark's passion narrative, and so Jesus the zealot disappeared from history. The pacific Jesus is a creation of Mark, expanded by the other evangelists.

The evidence for Jesus the zealot can be summed up quickly. It is the saying about the tribute, the presence of Simon the Zealot among the Twelve, the procession of palms and the cleansing of the temple, the swords in Gethsemane, and the Roman trial and execution. B. is not very clear on why the Roman arrests netted only the leader of the group. One has to say this evidence is very slender, and B. would admit this; he would say that it allows us to understand other passages of the Gospels which are obscure without this key. Perhaps, but the key renders other passages obscure which now appear clear.

The thesis that Jesus, apart from any theological statements about his person and his mission, had enough breadth and depth of vision to see a supranational, suprasectarian, and universally human assembly of man before God is abundantly supported in the New Testament. If Jesus was a zealot, he was nationalist-sectarian-ethnic by definition. Why must we conclude that Paul could have had such a vision but that Jesus could not? The genius of Jesus in this hypothesis seems to have been that rare type which compelled other men to attribute to him their own ideas.

The problem of the reviewer who wishes to submit B.'s thesis to objective historical criticism is that B. gives him so little to criticize. Even for a British university professor this book uses more subjunctives to the square inch than good style will tolerate. The reader is ultimately so fed up with what might have been, could have been, must have been that he ultimately despairs of ever learning what was.

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Of course Jesus could have been a zealot, historically speaking. If he was, then there has been a literary conspiracy to delete this fact. B. does not admit a conspiracy—he insists on the sincerity of the New Testament writers; but even if he did, he supplies neither the men capable of such a conspiracy nor the motive for the conspiracy. B. has not the evidence to show that Roman Christians in 71 needed this presentation of Jesus for any purpose nor that they had any needs which this presentation would have met. The Jewish rebellion created no anti-Jewish terror throughout the Roman Empire. Roman Christians had had their own anti-Christian terror in 64, and nothing we know about it indicates that there was any confusion between Jews and Christians in 64. Every element in B.'s thesis ultimately leads us to something which is not supported by any evidence, but which could have happened, might have happened, must have happened if Jesus were a zealot.

Frankly, Mark was not much of a historian, but he stuck to his sources better than B. has done. To repeat what was said at the beginning, I intend no implications that we know all there is to know about the life and teaching of Jesus. I agree that the Jewish-Christian gospel has left no certain trace in the New Testament. I have no reason to deny the abstract possibility that the Jewish-Christian community stood with the zealots against the Romans. I may add that if they did I can understand better why Paul had his troubles with them. That Jesus himself was a zealot raises historical and critical problems which are of some magnitude. Indeed, they can be resolved only on the hypothesis that we know nothing about Jesus at all. This too has been suggested by some of our predecessors, and it does not solve the problems either.

The Careless Atom

SHELDON NOVICK

Houghton Mifflin, $5.95

JOSEPH A. PAGE

A compromise required by participation in modern society is the individual's surrender of what might be termed his bodily integrity to technology's constant assault on the biosphere. Industrial development inevitably pollutes the environment. Mass production inevitably creates risks for consumers and workers. Exposure to these hazards is part of today's cost of living.

But the price becomes unreasonable when actual and potential exposure is kept completely beyond the ken and control of the citizen. The proposition that knowledge of such hazards and all decisions concerning them should be the exclusive preserve of a technocratic elite within industry and government is clearly unacceptable, for it has produced a profound sense of alienation and frustration in the increasing numbers of people aware of the steady deterioration of the environment. Moreover, the record amply demonstrates that the technocrats too often put the public welfare below such priorities as production and efficiency. One has merely to breathe the air in any large city, ponder statistics on highway accidents, peruse the files of the President's Product Safety Commission.

The Careless Atom adds to the list a new peril of potentially disastrous proportions. The construction of nuclear power plants in their present state of technological development creates a risk of explosion and contamination which could kill or injure thousands, and cause billions of dollars of property damage. The odds on a nuclear accident may be slight but because of the enormity of the hazard they cannot be ignored. Several minor mishaps have already occurred.

Sheldon Novick states a convincing

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REVIEWERS

FATHER JOHN L. MCKENZIE, S.J., is the author of several books on Scripture, most recently, *Vital Concepts of the Bible.*

JOSEPH A. PAGE teaches at the Georgetown University Law Center. His articles have appeared in the *Atlantic Monthly* and the *New Republic.*

FREDERICK FERRÉ is a professor of philosophy at Dickinson College in Pennsylvania.

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case against the rush to peacetime nuclear power. In his view, one reason for the rush is that scientists have used the possibility of the peacetime use of the atom as a sop to any guilt feelings they might have entertained while developing nuclear weapons.

Novick describes how past accidents came perilously close to becoming major disasters. He argues that traditional sources of fuel have been underestimated, and will last long enough to enable scientists to reduce the risk of nuclear accidents to a tolerable level. In other words, money now spent on construction should be devoted to research. But even the fact that nuclear plants are virtually uninsurable (private insurance companies will cover only a fraction of the risk) has not deterred industry from further construction of bigger plants. Under the Price-Anderson Act, the government provides insurance protection of up to $500 million. This will enable the taxpayer to subsidize any future nuclear accidents!

An important lesson to be drawn from *The Careless Atom* is that the technocrats, if left unchecked, are capable of decisions which might charitably be deemed strange. A classic example is the nuclear-powered generating plant planned by Pacific Gas & Electric for Bodega Bay in California. Happily thwarted by a loud public outcry, the plant was to be constructed only 1,000 feet from an earthquake fault. (This ranks a shade behind the decision of the Army to store enough nerve gas to kill the world's population several times over in above-ground containers next door to a busy airport near an earthquake fault at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal in Denver.)

An obvious response to the irresponsibility of corporations and government is to secure some degree of popular participation in the decision-making process as it relates to the environment. *The Careless Atom* illustrates how the communications media can fulfill their responsibility to make the public aware of the facts. An informed public can then engage in appropriate political action, initiate lawsuits, prod government agencies charged with regulating corporate activities, pressure corporations through mechanisms available to shareholders, and even resort to forms of direct action. At long last the New Left has begun thinking in these directions. A radical group calling itself CRAP (Conservation Research and Action Project) has begun agitation against the use of DDT in Wisconsin.

God and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God

ALVIN PLANTINGA

Cornell University Press, $8.50

FREDERICK FERRÉ

This book offers a very unusual exercise in thinking about the rational justification in belief in God; its author is a logician's logician and revels in the sheer exuberance of logical technique as he moves from topic to topic.

The topics themselves are not new. They are, if anything, the most classical of the classical problems in philosophy. And even when Plantinga turns to the contemporary issues he chooses only the most heavily traveled paths for his own arguments to follow. In Part I our author explores Natural Theology via the three standard (since Kant) arguments —the Cosmological Argument, the Ontological Argument, and the Teleological Argument—in their most familiar forms. The Cosmological Argument is scrutinized in the version presented by St. Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century; the Ontological Argument centers around St. Anselm's of the eleventh century and his primary current interpreters; and the Teleological Argument is seen mainly through Hume's great eighteenth century *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*. In Part II, where the topic is Natural Atheology (or attempted proofs of the illegitimacy of belief in God), the issues selected are the traditional problem of evil and the most thoroughly discussed of the controversies arising from language analysis. And in Part III, his epistemological problem of "Other Minds" is the one that has been argued more than any other for two generations.

It is not in subject matter, therefore, that Plantinga's book offers anything out of the ordinary. Nor is it in the positions he takes on the various standard topics. Concerning Natural Theology he remains with the majority, unconvinced by any of the arguments that purport to prove God. On Natural Atheology, likewise, he finds every attempted disproof fatally flawed. And when he turns to Other Minds he concludes that belief in their reality is reasonable but not inductively supportable in any standard fashion. None of this is surprising. It would be a difficult matter to find reputable philosophers holding different opinions at any of these points.

What *is* unusual about this book rather, is its style and form, and its startling final paragraphs. The style, first, is of the sort found—when it is found at all—in short technical articles in philosophical journals. To illustrate, in this case, is easier and briefer than to describe. Thus this reviewer opened the book at random and found on p. 126:

> The only proposition essential to theism and relevant to the deduction of (g) from propositions which are either necessary or essential elements of theism, however, appears to be (e) itself. Since that is so the atheologian must find a necessary premise from which
>
> (h) If there is any evil then there is unjustified evil
>
> follows; and this necessary proposition is to be added to the set (a)-(e) + (f^1). The last suggestion was that it is (i) which is to be added; and (a)-(e)+ (f^1)+ (i) clearly is a contradictory set. (i), however, appears to entail (k), an ethical proposition which the theist may well dispute.

The problem with this method, of course (one that is well illustrated by quoting it, like this, out of context), is that the argument is intelligible only to the degree that steady reference back to the numbered, lettered, or otherwise identified propositions is maintained by the reader. In a short discussion note or technical article this is readily accomplished. But in a full-sized book—or even within one of Plantinga's chapters

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—the morass of constantly multiplying numbers and letters (capital or small; Greek or Roman, primed or double-primed or unprimed) quickly starts to suck at even an experienced reader's heels. Granted a modicum of technical training and sufficient concentration, the argument can be followed; but in most cases the same arguments could have been put with equal precision and much less display by an author willing to work harder at communication.

Another problem with Plantinga's method of exposition is that it may give the summary a misleading impression of finality that is not warranted by the subject matter. Just as in physics beginning students are warned against carrying decimals, however readily calculable or however impressive, beyond the degree of significance appropriate to their problem, so in philosophy the "limits of significance" should be observed in the use of technical apparatus. Beyond those limits the pleasures of logical virtuosity may be enjoyed for their own sake, but if so this kind of enjoyment should be clearly labeled for what it is—and what it is not.

The other most striking feature of the book is Plantinga's concluding assessment of its result. In the final paragraphs he argues that since he has not been able to show belief in other minds inductively more probable than not, even on its best (analogical) argument, and since he has also not been able to show belief in God to be more probable than not on *its* best (also analogical) teleological argument; then, if it is nonetheless reasonable to continue believing in other minds, it must be equally reasonable to continue believing in God. One looks here for some trace of a smile, some hint to show that Plantinga intends (like Hume) to end on an ironic note of gentle mockery. But one looks in vain. One also looks in vain for all the crucial discussions that would prove, on the other hand, that Plantinga intends us to take his remarks seriously. He neglects, for example, to show that the failures of the two arguments are more than superficially similar; on closer inspection, in fact, they appear quite different except for the similar lettering he has assigned to the various propositions. He fails, further, to give a clear meaning to "reasonable" and its criteria (if any) when applied in such situations as his concluding reflections require. And although he notes that "it does not follow that a man can rationally hold *just any* such [i.e. epistemologically unsupported] belief without a reason or evidence" (p.207), he never proposes a standard of judgment by which we might determine, even roughly, which beliefs are to be given special favors of this kind. Moreover, in his claim that the teleological argument is "about as probable," relative to its body of evidence, as is the analogical argument for the existence of other minds relative to its own body of evidence, he neglects to supply any standard of relative probability by which this claim could be assessed; and in any case he seems in all this talk about one argument's being "about as probable" as the other to be obscuring the fact that the probabilities, on his own argument, are negligible.

At the finish, therefore, Plantinga suddenly pulls the reader out of his morass of hyper-precise "clarity" only to whirl him back into a new bog of vagueness and confusion where he is left wondering, breathlessly, whether the thrills of the rise were worth the price of admission.

IN BRIEF

The Israel-Arab Reader. Edited by Walter Laqueur. Bantam, $1.25.

An excellent collection of documents, declarations, and articles, from the first glimmerings of Zionism and Arab nationalism through the Balfour Declaration, and various commission reports, and concluding with reactions to the last Israel-Arab war. A modest book, yet one contributing much to an understanding of this terrible conflict—in Laqueur's words—"between Arab pride and dignity and Jewish survival."

The Resistance Versus Vichy: the Purge of Collaborators in Liberated France. By Peter Novick. Columbia University Press, $7.50.

The moral dilemmas surrounding the clash between Vichy France and the Resistance were more ambiguous than those posed for German supporters and opponents of the Third Reich. Perhaps for this reason, the study of these questions may be more applicable to contemporary issues than the Hitler experience so frequently evoked. Macmillan is translating Jacques Ducquesne's excellent account of the Church under Vichy, and Peter Novick has dared walk where Frenchmen (understandably) still fear

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to tread. A purge of Vichyites and collaborators was both necessary and unavoidable in post-Liberation France. Novick concludes that the Provisional Government handled this terrible inevitability "as honestly, as conscientiously, and as well as any group of men could in the circumstances." He also calculates the number of summary executions by the Liberation forces as much closer to the official figure of 10,000 than to the often cited right-wing claims of 100,000 or more.

CORRESPONDENCE

(Continued from page 3)

Jews who have lost their calm about black anti-Semitism and magnify its impact and significance. But, by and large, the Jewish community is, to my mind, far from a state of hysteria or frenzy about it. Most Jews, though disappointed, seem to take the matter philosophically. I have rather noticed a remarkable talent of many Jews to laugh at themselves in their troubles.

So, "frenzy" is not only too strong a word; it is a most misleading one.

Mr. Leo makes much in his article of Prof. Gary Marx's study of 1964, a work generally considered now dated. At one point he claims the work "has shown the black man remarkably free of the classic Christian and economic anti-Semitism." It does nothing of the sort. It proves no remarkable freedom from anti-Semitism but rather that the black people on the whole are *less* anti-Semitic than white non-Jews. Prof. Marx summarizes his findings thus: "To the degree that Negroes distinguish between Jewish and non-Jewish whites, they prefer the Jew" (p. 206).

What Mr. Leo seems to have missed is that since 1964 the frustrations of the blacks have increased, as has also a corresponding anger against whites generally. The Jews, the most visible white men to most blacks, have borne the brunt of this increase. So, irrespectively of any comparative increase, black anti-Semitism has undergone an absolute increase among rank and file blacks. The emergence of a new anti-Semitism on the part of the Black Nationalists and the New Left is something else again. One does not have to wait for "non-hysterical studies" to know these facts.

This is not Weimar Germany, as Mr. Leo says. But it could conceivably become such, if we choose to ignore the presence or import of anti-Semitic manifestations in our midst, no matter from what quarter or how trivial. If Weimar had paid more attention to the rantings of the Nazi party of the early 1920s, Hitler's regime might not have come to power. Mr. Leo's cavalier dismissal of singling out Jews as "harmless" serves blacks no better than Jews. We have at last gotten away from singling out blacks in unsavory news stories. Should we recommence with Jews?

Mr. Leo concludes his article with a somewhat humorous remark of a friend: "I never thought I'd live to see New York Jews running around in circles like a bunch of *Brooklyn Tablet* Catholics." Two weeks ago *Commonweal* ran a lead-article with a frank bias against

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Israel together with four responses. Even a four to one ratio hardly sets off the advantage of a position paper. And now Mr. Leo. Consider me a friend, dear Editor, when I say: "I never thought I'd live to see *'Commonweal* Catholics' making in circles like 'Christian Fronters.' "

REV. EDWARD H. FLANNERY
Secretariat for
Catholic-Jewish Relations

Proposal on Hopkins

Liverpool

To the Editors: It has been suggested that a Society should be formed to further the understanding and appreciation of the life and works of Gerard Manley Hopkins. Would those interested please write to either (Rev.) A. Thomas, S.J., St. Ignatius' Presbytery, 27 High Road, London N. 15, England, or Tom Dunne, 15 Long Lane, Breightmet, Bolton, Lancashire, England.

NORMAN WHITE

Supplementing Maloff

New York

To the Editors: Maloff's article [Feb. 21] on the Schomburg Collection refers to an Aug. 8 *Times* article on the decay of the collection. On May 2, 1968, Radio WMCA broadcast a 15-minute documentary on the collection's miserable condition—"A Heritage in Peril." The documentary's editorial conclusion accused the city and the sacred New York Public Library of "official vandalism."

Stung by our criticism, the library juggled some internal funds to provide for an accelerated program of microfilming one-of-a-kind documents and for a program of preservation for the originals. It also exerted itself to do what it originally said was not possible—get a renewal of federal funds for extra staff.

Since then, the Harlem community agitated for "community control" of the collection, and the New York Public Library, in a magnificent cop-out, said okay, take it. The community, caught flat-footed by the Library's super-willingness to rid itself of a burden it never really wanted, is now scraping desperately for funds and a board to administer them.

At the time WMCA did its documentary, we bought the Library's explanation in good faith: all its collections were deteriorating from time and increasing overuse; it was dipping ever more into its endowment (instead of living on the endowment's interest) just to keep its head above water; and that it was spending more on the Schomburg, proportionately, than on any other collection.

Meanwhile, the city, through Mayor Lindsay's office, merely shrugged off the whole problem, passing the buck to the Library and saying, in effect, that it was impossible to play favorites among all the Library's constituencies of scholars. It was a Library, not a city, problem.

If we grant the truth of the Library's explanations, it seems a shame, as Mr. Maloff says, that someone did not snatch the "coup" that was available—either City Hall or Columbia University or *someone*—to show in full measure that society *did* care.

And as for the city's off-the-cuff's unwillingness to play favorites—and the same attitude was implicit in the public squirming of Library officials when we pinned them against the wall for on-the-record comments—nobody seemed to recognize that there is a time and place for everything; that indeed, in the midst of our racial crisis, this *was* the time for that extra effort to preserve—or at least to microfilm—the black man's heritage.

Sure, other collections are falling apart. But at least there's a record that they exist. In the Schomburg's disarray, nobody's sure of just what's in it, except that one-of-a-kind documents crumble to pieces when you pick them up.

In my opinion, Mr. Maloff is quite correct in leveling his charge that this neglect is another guise of white racism. The Library has taken some big steps in the past nine months to correct its error.

But there's enough evidence—including its current cop-out—to indicate that over the years, the Library has considered black history, literature and art as a subculture to be tolerated, not as an integral part of American tradition to be cherished.

This is too bad, especially in these dangerous times for our city. As we said in our documentary, "if the roots are gone, there will be no chance for understanding, and without understanding, the prejudices will remain."

HENRY WALTER
Director of Public Affairs, WMCA

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